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CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION OVERSIGHT:
RULES v. STANDARDS
Philip T. Hackney *
Abstract
Congress has traditionally utilized standards as a means of
communicating charitable tax law in the Code. In the past fifteen years,
however, Congress has increasingly turned to rules to stop fraud and abuse
in the charitable sector. I review the rules versus standards debate to
evaluate this trend. Are congressional rules the best method for regulating
the charitable sector? While the complex changing nature of charitable
purpose would suggest standards are better, the inadequacy of IRS
enforcement and the large number of unsophisticated charitable
organizations both augur strongly in favor of rules. Congress, however, is
not the ideal institution to implement rules for charitable purpose. The IRS
is the better institution generally to institute rules there because of its
informational advantage over Congress. Additionally, the IRS can implement
rules in a more flexible rule format than can Congress. Still, Congress as a
rulemaker makes sense in a few scenarios: (1) where it implements
transparent procedural requirements; (2) where it regulates discrete
behavior of charitable organization acts; and, (3) where it intends to remove
a set of organizations from charitable status through simple rules.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a June 2006 press release Senator Charles Grassley lamented that
“some individuals are exploiting vagueness or silence in or a lack of
enforcement of the laws governing tax-exempt groups to enrich themselves
rather than serve the public.”1 Soon after that press release, Senator Grassley
inserted a series of narrow yet significant and complex legal changes to the
law of tax-exempt charitable organizations into the Pension Protection Act
of 2006 (“PPA”).2 After the PPA, Senator Grassley sponsored legislation
regarding charitable nonprofit hospitals that Congress enacted as part of the
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).3
Although these laws applied to a variety of organizational types, they
all used technical rules to stop abuses of the charitable sector.4 I examine this
trend to evaluate whether it is a positive move for charitable organization
oversight. I look to the literature on rules and standards,5 and conclude that
Congress should primarily enact standards and permit the IRS to develop the
specific rules.6 Not only does the IRS have the expertise, but it also has the

1
Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Grassley Solicits IRS Comment, Urges Enforcement
on Series of Problems in the Tax-Exempt Arena (June 1, 2006), http://www.finance.senate.gov/
newsroom/chairman/release/?id=022c68f3-f4fd-4752-a120-5448b9528ea4.
2

Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 1211–1245, 120 Stat. 780, 1094–1102.

3

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

4

Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 70
(2011) (identifies this trend and argues it is a result of relying on one simple standard for too large a sector
and too many different benefits). Others contend that IRS oversight is such a mess that we should strongly
consider pulling enforcement responsibility from the IRS and provide it to a new independent agency.
Lloyd H. Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour Is Discretion”: Should the IRS Change or Surrender Its
Oversight of Tax Exempt Organizations, ___ COLUM. J. TAX L. ___ (forthcoming 2016).
5
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULEBASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124
YALE L.J. 576 (2014); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65
(1983) (discussing how to best design rules); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 585 (1993); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (2002); Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995).
6
Admittedly, historically, Congress, the U.S. Dept. of the Treas., and the IRS have overseen
charitable tax law in just this way. Professor Colinvaux argues that this approach has led to a vast unwieldy
charitable sector and an oversight mess. Colinvaux, supra note 4, at 6. He argues that this standard-based
system led to scandals that can only be cured by a restructuring of the way we regulate charity at the

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2015.41 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

Vol. 13 2015 | Charitable Organization |

85

flexibility to respond to changing conditions. Adopting rules to define
charitable purpose at the statutory level is likely to lead to harmfully
overinclusive and underinclusive rules. It also is likely to make the regime
more difficult for the IRS to administer,7 and for a mostly unsophisticated
nonprofit sector to navigate. I also contend that the IRS should use more
flexible rulemaking, such as revenue rulings and revenue procedures, instead
of less flexible regulations. Nevertheless, Congress should consider rules in
a few instances: (1) where a process might credibly be thought to improve
charitable behavior; (2) where it can regulate a discrete act common to all
charitable organizations; and, (3) where it can eliminate a sector of charitable
organizations with a simple rule.
This article arose out of a symposium to address whether the regulation
of charitable organizations is broken and, if so, whether it can be fixed. In
addressing this question, we must first identify a problem. Because the
problem is large in scope, this article identifies a relatively narrow one—the
effectiveness of tax legislation regarding charitable organizations.8 This
article asks three questions: (1) what type of legal commands should govern

federal level. Id. He also contends that the recent congressional legislation is only a symptom of a failed
system. Id. at 8. I do not contend here that charitable oversight has been ideal. I only contend that some
recent congressional rule-based legislation is likely to make the situation worse rather than better. Whether
the charitable tax system itself should be chopped up and divided based on the governmental benefit
provided, as Colinvaux suggests, is beyond the scope of this article. However, I do believe we should
think broadly in the way Colinvaux recommends; but, I caution, that the rules/standards challenge
discussed in this paper should be kept in mind in any such reenvisioning. Also, this Article does not make
the claim that Congress should enact standards throughout the Code because of its complexity and the
changing nature of society. Nevertheless, some have called for Congress to delegate more rulemaking to
the IRS and other related agencies to reap the benefit of the expertise of the IRS. See James R. Hines, Jr.
& Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax 10 (Univ. of Michigan Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 391,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402047.
7
See David Weisbach, Cost of Departures from Formalism: Formalism in Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 860 (1999) (arguing that in contexts where there are thousands of possible complex permutations of
a law, a rule based regime can make the law particularly complex); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-15-420R, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: OBSERVATIONS ON IRS OPERATIONS, PLANNING,
AND RESOURCES (2015) (describing the severe lack of resources under which the IRS at current operates);
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., I.R.S., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2014) (detailing the
particularly severe resource problem of the exempt organizations division of the IRS—the division that
oversees charitable organizations).
8
Although some lament the federalization of charitable oversight, it is quite clear that Congress,
the IRS, and federal courts have federalized charitable oversight. See generally Mark L. Ascher,
Federalization of the Law of Charity, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1581 (2014).
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charitable organizations in the tax arena—rules or standards, (2) if rules are
needed, who should develop those rules, and (3) what form should those rules
take?
In the rules versus standards debate, a rule is typically defined as a legal
command that determines a case before an act, while a standard is a legal
command that requires an adjudicator to make a determination after an act.9
In considering whether to enact a rule or a standard some scholars focus on
where it is most efficient to generate the information needed for a good rule.10
The choice to use a rule or a standard affects the complexity and costs of
enforcing a particular regime, the likelihood of compliance, and raises issues
of the rule of law and democracy.11 Finally, separate and apart from questions
of efficiency or democracy is the question of which type of legal command
is more likely to achieve justice.
The biggest problem with rules is that they tend to generate legal
commands that are both overinclusive and underinclusive.12 By
overinclusive, I mean that the rule will prohibit activities the lawmakers did
not intend to prohibit. By underinclusive, I mean that the rule will fail to
prohibit activities the lawmakers intended to prohibit. Standards may be
superior where that underinclusive and overinclusiveness arises because of
technical detail, quickly changing circumstances, or highly complex factual
situations. Rules are likely to be superior on any issue that repeats often and
is universal. Underinclusion and overinclusion are likely very tolerable in
such a situation.
Regarding the first question above, the factors point in two different
directions. Standards are superior to rules for two reasons: (1) the legal

9
This is a simplification chosen because it helps in analyzing this question at its simplest level.
Anyone who is familiar with law realizes that these legal commands can come in all shapes and sizes.
Some possibilities include factors, standards, presumptions, guidelines, principles or analogies. Each of
these legal forms possesses both advantages and disadvantages. Some scholars have begun to look at the
advantages and disadvantages with some of these methods of developing law. See, e.g., Susan Morse,
Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2016).
10

Kaplow, supra note 5, at 585.

11

SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 159 (discussing the fact that rules allocate power, and that there is
often a concern that failing to pass rules allows unelected judges to make the rules rather than allow the
democracy to make the rules).
12

See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 31–34.
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concept of a charitable organization calls for an analysis of every fact
associated with a particular organization over a year period; and (2) the ideal
notion of “charitable” expressed by Congress changes over time as
technology and society changes. These factors require a complex legal
analysis and make good rules difficult to formulate. Four factors suggest
rules might be superior: (1) there are a large number of charitable
organizations, (2) there is a significant amount of money in the sector,
(3) IRS resources to oversee the sector are minimal, and (4) a large portion
of the charitable sector is unsophisticated. In weighing these conflicting
factors a need to make the system workable seems paramount and therefore
some level of rules make good sense.
Regarding the second question, Congress is the generally the wrong
institutional player to enact rules to define charitable purpose.13 Because the
IRS can modify, adjust, and perfect rules utilizing information gained
through daily case-by-case analysis, the IRS is much more likely to develop
rules that will not be harmfully underinclusive and overinclusive. Because it
works daily with the charitable sector, the IRS is likely to have better current
information regarding the particular organizational types applying than is
Congress. Additionally, the IRS is constantly evaluating the state of
charitable law providing it a greater flexibility, and responsiveness, to the
changing nature of charitable tax law than Congress. Nevertheless, there are
circumstances where Congress is likely a good institution to implement rules.
Congress should make rules regarding discrete acts that cross all charitable
organizations. It may also be a good institution from which to design simple
rules of process. Finally, where it can eliminate a category of charitable
organizations with a simple rule, it should consider acting.
As to the third question, the IRS should primarily communicate rules
through revenue rulings, and other lower-level guidance items, rather than
regulations. This tends to be the historical practice of Congress and the IRS
in implementing policy in the charitable sector. Once in place, legislation and
regulations are much harder to change, increasing the potential disconnect
between the state of the law on the books and appropriate outcomes. Lower
level guidance such as revenue rulings and revenue procedures tend to be

13
This part strongly implicates a question of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to
an agency. More work is needed to fully assess the wisdom of where to properly place this rulemaking
authority. However, this analysis based on rules and standards theory does strongly suggest that Congress
is not the ideal institutional player for this work.
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easier to change. This strategy will maintain the information and flexibility
advantage of the IRS in rulemaking, but also provide a satisfactory level of
certainty.
Admittedly, there are problems with this plan. It leaves a high degree of
discretion to unelected bureaucrats, and it might lessen reliance and stability,
two important components of a rule-based regime.14 While many might
object to the suggested high degree of discretion granted to the Service here
as anti-democratic,15 Congress, the President, and the courts have the ability
to check the Service’s rulemaking.16 This should alleviate in part such
democratic concerns. Additionally, regular guidance from the IRS through
revenue rulings could balance taxpayer needs for reliance and stability
against the equally important need for flexibility and good information.17
A further implication of this analysis is that the IRS and the Treasury
Department should put a significant amount of its resources towards
implementing rules. Many commentators believe that the IRS has not
provided enough charitable tax law guidance over the past twenty years.18
Under this analysis, the IRS would be wise to spend its resources primarily
on revenue rulings and revenue procedures rather than on much more time
consuming regulations.
In light of these normative conclusions, this article reviews and critiques
EO legislation regarding credit counseling organizations, supporting
organizations, and hospitals. Congress employed relatively detailed rules for
each of these legislative actions in order to stem perceived abuses by many
in those industry sectors. These complex rules should prove to be harmful to

14

SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 155–58.

15

See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 606 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring)
(stating that he is concerned about the authority granted to the IRS to determine fundamental public policy
presumably from a concern about the democratic implications).
16
See Hines & Logue, supra note 6 (making the case that providing delegation authority to the IRS
is not that anti-democratic because of the checks of Congress, but also the fact that the President is elected
and ultimately controls the rulemaking at the agency level).
17
This article leaves to another article whether the IRS should follow Administrative Procedure
Act requirements of notice and comment in enacting revenue rulings and procedures, as well as the correct
level of deference courts should extend to these IRS guidance items, in the charitable organization realm.
See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013).
18

See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 4.
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the oversight of this sector by imposing rules that will be both underinclusive
and overinclusive, overly complicated for both organizations and IRS
enforcement, and likely to take away the flexibility of the Service in
overseeing the charitable sector.
This Article raises a number of separate but related issues. The question
of who should develop rules—Congress or an agency—raises the question of
the delegation power of Congress. The delegation debate is quite similar to
the rules v. standards debate. The two focus on questions of democracy and
which institution is most likely to have the best ability from an informational
perspective to get the law right. Those who argue for broad delegation argue
(1) that agencies have greater knowledge and expertise than their
congressional counterpart, and (2) the agency process can ensure the law gets
made. Those who argue against broad delegation claim that agency based law
is less legitimate and less accountable than law made by Congress.19 The
delegation debate also raises questions about agency discretionary power,20
and the legal validity of the form of rulemaking for which this Article
advocates: non-regulatory modes of guidance.21 Because this latter issue is
particularly messy and challenging, but highly important to the question of
how effective less formal guidance might be, I hope to address this matter of
delegation and tax exempt charitable organization guidance in a separate
article.
Part II of this article reviews charitable tax law. It also examines in detail
the changes made to that law over the past fifteen years with a focus on three
particular rule changes through legislation including: (1) credit counseling
organizations; (2) hospitals; and (3) supporting organizations. Part III
reviews the literature regarding rules and standards. Part IV considers the
implications of the rules and standards literature on (1) whether rules or

19
For a discussion of these issues, see Hines & Logue, supra note 6; Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985);
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
775 (1999); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
20
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); see also Philip T. Hackney, Should the
IRS Never “Target” Taxpayers: An Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 453
(2015) (considering the degree of discretion granted to the IRS by Congress over its determination
function).
21
See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 17, at 471 (examining the legal force of “I.R.B. guidance” such
as revenue rulings).
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standards should be enacted for charitable tax law, (2) if rules should be
implemented, who should implement them, and (3) what form those rules
should take. Part V applies this analysis to critique the chosen pieces of recent
tax-exempt legislation. Part VI concludes.
II. CHARITABLE TAX LAW
A. What Is the Rationale of Charitable Tax Law?
At a basic level, the primary purpose of charitable tax law must be to
ensure that individuals all bear the proper income tax burden. In other words,
it is aimed at helping to define the income tax base. The initial justification
for charitable tax exemption held that we provide a subsidy to organizations
that provide a public benefit that is at least equal to the tax given up. This
some public benefit justification has little content though. Efforts have been
made to define that necessary public benefit. The most accepted theory is
Hansmann’s market failure theory that posits we should provide tax
exemption to those organizations that are providing a public good or solving
an important contract failure.22 Some have suggested that encouraging
altruism is a sufficient good in itself,23 while others have contended that
charitable organizations simply do not have income to speak of.24 There does
seem to be consensus that the income of charitable organizations is generally
not a part of the tax base.
However, because of the role that the IRS plays in reviewing charitable
organizations nationally, many also see the role of the IRS as a regulator of
the charitable sector.25 Whether it is a legitimate rationale or not, Congress

22
Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
23
Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990). Others have
suggested that it is important to consider distributive justice concerns as much as efficiency and pluralism
concerns emphasized by other scholars. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax
Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010).
24
Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
25
John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006)
(discussing the regulatory function of the income tax exempt organization system); see also Hackney,
supra note 20 (arguing that one justification for charitable tax exemption might be to regulate charitable
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uses charitable tax law to regulate the charitable sector. This means there are
at least two primary purposes of charitable tax law that our legislature might
intend. The first focuses on making value judgments about organizations that
are worthy of not paying taxes; the second focuses on making value
judgments about whether a particular act is charitable in nature. This is a
combination of the support and equity functions of the tax-exempt system
identified by Simon, Chisholm and Dale.26
There is, too, another purpose that charitable tax law arguably serves: to
enhance pluralism.27 Justice Powell spoke clearly about this role in a
concurrence in Bob Jones University.
As Justice Brennan has observed, private, nonprofit groups receive tax exemptions
because “each group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and
enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.” Far from representing an
effort to reinforce any perceived “common community conscience,” the provision
of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of limiting the
influence of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life.28

Continuing in this vein, Burton Weisbrod has argued that the nonprofit
sector is useful to solve government failure to provide public goods at an
optimal level.29 Because the government will only provide for the needs of
the median voter, nonprofits can provide the services and needs of those on

organizations). However, states are generally expected to regulate charitable organizations. Thus, some
scholars find the idea that the IRS might engage in the regulation of charitable organizations to be
problematic. See, e.g., James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 548–49 (2010).
26

Simon et al., supra note 25.

27

See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 8–9 (1992); David A.
Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption-Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race
Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 15 (2006); cf. Philip Hackney, Taxing the Unheavenly
Chorus: Why Section 501(c)(6) Trade Associations Are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92 DENV. U. L.
REV. 265 (2015) (questioning whether tax exemption always enhances pluralism).
28
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397
U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
29

BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 66–67

(1977).
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the margins.30 If in fact our charitable organizations are fulfilling this
pluralistic goal, we should expect charitable tax law to change rather than to
stay static.
Pluralism posits that society is made up of many interests whose needs
can be satisfied through political means.31 Groups form to represent interests,
such as business or labor. Those groups then request that the government
provide certain goods and services. As David Truman envisioned, this system
works in waves.32 As one interest is fulfilled, another interest will arise
seeking to take back something that was lost to the other group. Thus, through
time, we should see new and different groups forming in this pluralistic
fashion. In fact, if we accept that pluralism should be a part of our goal for
charitable tax law, we should also build a law that is flexible enough to accept
such changes in our political and social life. Otherwise, the system will in
fact not support pluralism.
B. Tax Exempt Charitable Organization Law
When Congress enacted the Income Tax in 1913, it included an
exemption from income tax for charitable organizations.33 This exemption
can also be found in earlier iterations of the income tax and the corporate
income tax in the United States.34 Congress absolved entities with a particular
organizational structure and purpose from an obligation to pay the income
tax, but required all other persons and entities to pay tax on income whether
at the organizational level35 or at the individual level.36

30
WEISBROD, supra note 29, at 66–67; cf. Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 803 (2012) (arguing that Weisbrod’s theory based on the median voter
ignores public choice theory which posits that the median voter does not always control).
31

SCOTT H. AINSWORTH, ANALYZING INTEREST GROUPS 5 (2001).

32

DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 59 (1951).

33

Tariff Act, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913).

34

For a history of the corporate income tax and exemptions therefrom, see Philip T. Hackney, What
We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115, 131–35 (2013).
35

I.R.C. § 11.

36

Id. § 1.
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Although most Americans probably think that the Code consists solely
of detailed rules, in fact Congress has generally employed broad standards in
the Code to govern charitable organizations. To be described in § 501(c)(3),
an organization must (1) meet a certain organizational form; (2) be organized
and operated exclusively for a charitable purpose; and (3) prohibit the
inurement of net earnings to any private shareholder or individual.37 Later,
Congress added a prohibition on engaging in more than a substantial amount
of lobbying38 and completely prohibited the intervening in a political
campaign.39 While some of § 501(c)(3) works in a rule-like manner, arguably
(1) and (3) above, the heart of § 501(c)(3) is the mandate to operate
exclusively for a charitable purpose. On this issue, Congress provided no
explicit guidance in legislative history or otherwise. It established a standard
with the flexibility of the common law legal concept of charity.40
The IRS provides some modest content to the standard in regulations by
defining charitable,41 educational,42 scientific,43 and other related terms.
However, it has primarily stayed at the broad standard level in its regulations.
For instance, the IRS states that the term charitable has the meaning given
“in its generally accepted legal sense.”44 The IRS often interprets this choice
to mean that it adopted the broad standard developed under the law of
charitable trusts.45 The IRS typically includes examples in its regulations that
provide some rules; however, many complain that those examples only

37

Id. § 501(c)(3).

38

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-29-05, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF
THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2005).
39

Id. at 59.

40

John P. Persons et al., Criteria for Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS:
SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 1909, 1921–22
(1977).
41

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2014).

42

Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3).

43

Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5).

44

Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).

45

See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (1969) (turning to the law of charitable trusts to
determine the meaning of charitable in its “generally accepted legal sense of the word”).
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illustrate the very clear situations that no one would question anyway. This
means that the examples often do little work to define charitable purpose.
While the Code and regulations regarding charitable organizations have
historically relied on broad standards, the IRS has created rules to implement
these standards. The IRS has done this primarily through less formal
guidance, such as revenue rulings and revenue procedures.46 These guidance
items announce rules that constrain the discretion of the IRS and provide
more certainty to the charitable sector.47 For instance, in Rev. Rul. 76-204
the IRS ruled that an organization that acquires and preserves ecologically
significant undeveloped land furthers a national policy of preserving natural
resources and thereby serves a charitable purpose through advancing
education and science.48 Rev. Rul. 75-74 provides that a public interest law
firm that litigates cases that provides representation in cases of important
public interest that are not economically feasible for private firms operates
for a charitable purpose. In the public interest law firm line of business, the
IRS additionally issued a revenue procedure that provided specific rule-based
guidelines to operate these firms such as specific rules on the acceptance of
fees and how much in fees they could accept.49 There are hundreds of other
guidance items along these lines.
The IRS develops these guidance items in large part based on its agents’
interactions with charitable organizations in adjudications. For instance, the
IRS constructed its principal revenue ruling on hospitals in 1969 based upon
its agents’ work in assessing lots of hospitals over many years.50 The agents

46
See, e.g., id. (establishing the community benefit rule for hospitals trying to qualify as charitable
organizations); Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115 (establishing rules for organizations trying to qualify
as charitable by providing housing).
47
A review of the IRS Exempt Organization Continuing Professional Education Topical Index
gives a decent idea as to the breath of the industries the IRS and the Treasury Department and the courts
have opined upon and provided greater stability and reliance for taxpayers. http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/cpeindexbytopic.pdf. Arguably, in many instances some of the revenue rulings discussed in those
documents may be thought to have established sets of factors rather than establishing rules per se.
However, I leave that question for below in discussing the nature of rules and the necessary open texture
that is left in any rule. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 34–37.
48

Rev. Rul. 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174.

49

Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-1 C.B. 411.

50

Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
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audit and review the applications of charitable organizations.51 Charitable
organizations also seek private letter rulings on transactions they plan to
enter. These daily adjudications can provide guidance both to the IRS and the
public. While private letter rulings are only applicable to the organization
that received the ruling, the private letter rulings are generally available to
the public and give an understanding of the direction the IRS might choose
under a particular circumstance. More importantly for this project, these
regular interactions can provide the employees of the IRS deep knowledge
of charitable organizations and the law through a case-by-case method.
Courts fill in some of those rules as well.52 Congress provides charitable
organizations the right to challenge any IRS decision denying the
organization charitable status.53 A charitable organization can also challenge
IRS decisions in court by refusing to pay a tax and then seeking a refund from
the IRS based on the organization’s tax-exempt status.54 Utilizing this power
of review, for instance, courts have played a role in defining the contours of
charitable organizations and healthcare.55 Within the healthcare sphere,
courts determined that health maintenance organizations that sold insurance
but also provided actual care through a clinic with doctors could qualify for
charitable status.56 In another instance, a court determined that a health plan
by itself, without any substantial charitable activity such as operating a clinic
or providing services for free could not qualify for charitable status.57
Courts can sometimes interrupt the coherency that might be developed
via IRS policy. For instance, as will be discussed more below, a court case
rejecting an IRS ruling regarding a credit counseling organization may have

51

Hackney, supra note 20.

52

See, e.g., Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945) (establishing that “exclusively
operating for an exempt purpose” meant “no more than insubstantial”); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (confirming that there is a public policy limitation on the activities of charitable
organizations under the Code).
53

I.R.C. § 7428.

54

I.R.C. § 7422.

55

See, e.g., Sound Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158 (1978); Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r,
985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993); IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188.
56

Sound Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158 (1978).

57

IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188.

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2015.41 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

96 | Pittsburgh

Tax Review | Vol. 13 2015

led in part to the abuse of charitable law by credit counseling organizations.58
The IRS had limited charitable credit counseling organizations to serving the
poor and low income. The court found that ruling too narrow and reversed
the IRS ruling. Nevertheless, court review obviously serves as an important
check on the power of the IRS, and at the same time, that review serves to
develop the rules regarding charitable organizations on a case-by-case basis.
While Congress has mostly used standards in the Code to govern
charitable organizations, it has used rules in some instances. In 1969,
Congress enacted a detailed rule-based regime to govern private foundations.
Private foundations are a subset of charitable organizations that do not
receive broad public support.59 For instance, the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, and the Ford Foundation are private foundations because they
received almost all of their support from one family. Private foundations are
subject to detailed rules that focus in on a required payout regime.60 To prove
they are charitable, they must annually make grants of a significant
percentage of their assets to qualified charitable causes.61 They are subjected
to stringent rules regarding self-dealing.62 Congress has also arguably chosen
to utilize rules to implement the unrelated business income tax.63
Congress tends to use rules for charitable tax law primarily in instances
where it is able to focus on strict numbers or individual acts. For instance,
Congress uses rules in part to govern private foundations where it is focusing
primarily on numbers. Foundations must pay out a specific amount of money
to charitable purposes annually to qualify. Congress unsurprisingly also
adopts rules to govern the unrelated business income tax, again a matter of
numbers. Although there are issues to still sort out, the UBIT provisions have
a relatively high level of specificity as to what items go into income or not.
Congress uses rules for discrete acts too. It uses rules to govern private

58
Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 78-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9660, 44
A.F.T.R.2d 79-5122 (D.D.C. 1978).
59

I.R.C. § 509.

60

Id. §§ 4942, 4945.

61

I.R.C. §§ 4942, 4945.

62

Id. § 4941.

63

Id. §§ 511–514.
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foundation excise taxes such as for self-dealing. If a manager engages in a
self-dealing transaction we simply determine the amount involved in the
discrete act and we apply a tax.
C. Parties Regulated/State of Enforcement
What does the regulatory environment look like in the charitable sector?
It generates around five percent of GDP.64 More than two trillion dollars of
total assets held in the charitable sector are held in the health and education
fields.65 Almost 70% of the individual organizations hold less than one
million dollars in assets, while less than three percent of charitable
organizations hold 80% of the assets.66 There were around 1.2 million
registered public charities in 2012 according to IRS statistics.67 This likely
does not come close to counting all charitable organizations. This is because
churches and small organizations, the combination of which makes up a big
part of the charitable sector, need not register.68 Of the total number of
registered organizations, only 274,000 filed information returns.69
Approximately 85,000 of those organizations filed a Form 990-EZ.70 The
Form 990-EZ is filed by small organizations with annual gross receipts
normally less than $200,000 and assets no more than $500,000.71
Organizations with annual gross receipts of an amount normally less than

64
Brice S. McKeever & Sarah L. Pettijohn, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2014, URB. INST. (Oct.
2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413277-The-Nonprofit-Sectorin-Brief--.PDF.
65
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-164, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER
COMPLIANCE INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 14 (2014).
66

Id.

67

See McKeever & Pettijohn, supra note 64.

68

I.R.C. § 508.

69

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 9.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 5–6.
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$50,000 need not file an information return, but instead must file a 990-N
every three years.72 In 2014, over 470,000 organizations filed Form 990-Ns.73
The vast majority of charitable organizations are small organizations.
Charitable organizations held $2.99 trillion in assets in 2012.74 Of that
amount though, the health and education sector held more than $2 trillion.75
Almost 70% of the individual organizations hold less than $1 million in
assets, while less than three percent of charitable organizations held 80% of
the assets.76 From this information, it seems reasonable to conclude that about
70 to 80% of charitable organizations are unsophisticated and have little
access to legal counsel. Conversely, perhaps 20 to 30% of the charitable
world possesses some amount of resources that may enable them to seek
counsel. In fact, there are a few categories of the charitable sector where the
resources are fairly significant. This would include the hospital sector, health
maintenance organizations, universities, and the foundation world. This stark
divergence in sophistication, size, and money likely makes drafting rules and
regulating the charitable sector highly challenging.
What about the IRS and its resources? After the Tea Party affair,77 it has
been well documented that the enforcement resources are inadequate.78
Additionally, the audit rate is quite low.79 In most years the IRS audits less

72
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL ELECTRONIC FILING REQUIREMENT FOR SMALL EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS—FORM 990-N (E-POSTCARD) (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-NonProfits/Annual-Electronic-Filing-Requirement-for-Small-Exempt-Organizations-Form-990-N-(ePostcard); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65.
73

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 72.

74

McKeever & Pettijohn, supra note 64.

75

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65.

76

Id.

77

Hackney, supra note 20 (evaluating the controversy over the IRS applying particularly close
scrutiny to conservative organizations such as the Tea Party seeking to be declared as tax exempt by the
IRS because described as social welfare organizations).
78
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7 (describing the severe lack of resources
under which the IRS at current operates); TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 7 (detailing the
particularly severe resource problem of the exempt organizations division of the IRS—the division that
oversees charitable organizations).
79
See Charity and Nonprofit Audits (July 17, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-NonProfits/Exempt-Organizations-Audit-Process (describing the IRS EO division audit process for charitable
organizations).
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than one percent of the existing charitable organization population.80 Fewer
than 900 employees work in the IRS’s EO division to oversee over one
million organizations of various sophistication and ability.81 Thus, the IRS
looks like a typical agency that has too few resources to carry out its mandate.
It operates two primary programs: (1) a determinations system where it
evaluates whether to grant an organization a letter stating that the
organization is tax exempt; and (2) an examination system where it annually
examines nonprofits through audits and other reviews of their materials. It
appears that the IRS is neither able to closely monitor the determination
system, nor to stay on top of its examination system.
D. The Recent Push to Regulate Abuses of Charity Through the Code
With notable exceptions, Congress has generally left it to the IRS to
write charitable tax law rules. However, in the last ten years, Congress has
taken a more rule-based approach.82 The motivation for the legislation seems
to be a desire to stop abuses of the charitable contribution deduction, but also
a desire to hinder charitable organizations from taking advantage of
vulnerable populations. This part briefly reviews three select pieces of
legislation enacted over the past ten years.
In 2006, as part of the PPA,83 Senator Grassley succeeded in enacting a
number of additional somewhat eclectic, but highly complex, provisions
directed at the charitable sector. Two of the provisions included stricter

80

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65.

81

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT & FY
2013 WORKPLAN, at 14 (2013).
82
This is not to say that Congress has always left the charitable regime alone. In 1969, Congress
imposed significant rules on the sector. That attention was mostly focused on delineating private
foundations from public charities, and imposing strict excise taxes on the former. That was not focused
on any particular charitable industry, but more focused on the likely independent public governance, or
lack thereof, of organizations identified as private foundations. Congress also has alternatively generally
eliminated insurance from qualifying as charitable and has added a more rule-based regime to govern
excess benefit transactions. I.R.C. §§ 501(m), 4958. The more recent legislation is particularly interesting
for its foray into governing the rules regarding qualifying as a charitable organization in a particular
industry.
83

Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
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limitations on “credit counseling organizations,”84 and more defined rules
regarding supporting organizations to ensure these organizations are
genuinely providing benefits and services to charitable organizations.85 In
2010, Senator Grassley was also instrumental in enacting § 501(r), which
imposed stricter rules on the operation of nonprofit hospitals claiming
charitable status. Grassley inserted the new nonprofit hospital legislation into
the ACA signed by President Obama in 2010. More information regarding
each of these organizations is provided below in Part V along with an
evaluation of the legislation.
Credit Counseling Legislation: In reaction to an understanding that
many credit counseling organizations were engaged in abuse of debtors,
Congress enacted § 501(q) to closely restrict behavior of credit counseling
organizations. If an organization provides substantial credit counseling
services, it is required to meet a laundry list of requirements: it must
(1) provide services “narrowly tailored” to the specific needs and
circumstances of consumers; (2) not make of or negotiate loans for debtors;
(3) help creditors improve their credit only incidentally to their counseling
regarding debt; (4) provide services without regard to the ability of a debtor
to pay for the services; (5) implement a fee policy that is generally not based
upon the percentage of debt a debtor owes; (6) appoint an independent
community based board of directors; (7) not own more than a certain portion
of a business that is engaged in lending money; (8) not pay or receive money
for referrals; (9) not solicit contributions from consumers in an initial
meeting to seek assistance; and (10) not receive more than 50% of its
revenues from creditors associated with debt management plans.86 On the
rule to standard continuum, these are certainly on the rule side of the
continuum.
Hospital Legislation: In 2010, Senator Grassley successfully added to
the ACA, and Congress passed, a new Code section detailing requirements
for a hospital to qualify as a charitable organization. The main change
appears in § 501(r) of the Code. Hospitals on a facility-by-facility basis must
meet four primary requirements: (1) establish a written financial assistance

84

I.R.C. § 501(q).

85

Id. §§ 509(a)(3), 4958, 4966.

86

I.R.C. § 501(q).
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and emergency medical care policy; (2) conduct a community health needs
assessment annually and implement a strategy to address those needs;
(3) limit its charges to uninsured individuals; and (4) not engage in certain
extraordinary collection actions.87 Congress also imposed a requirement on
the IRS: it must audit each hospital once every three years.88
Supporting Organization Legislation: Supporting organizations are a
form of charitable organization that qualifies for the favored charitable tax
status of a public charity rather than as a private foundation.89 There are three
types of supporting organizations, conveniently labeled Type I, Type II, and
Type III.90 When the IRS audited a number of supporting organizations in
the early 2000s, the IRS determined that it had little concern that taxpayers
were abusing the Type I and Type II supporting organizational structures.
The IRS believed those structures provided sufficient oversight because of
substantial supervision by a supported organization.91 Of the three subjects
of new rules, the supporting organization rules are the least like the other two.
A supporting organization is a type of charitable organization structure rather
than a line of business. Credit counseling organizations and hospitals
represent a distinct line of business.
In 2006, Congress placed substantial new rules on supporting
organizations.92 It imposed restrictive rules on Type III supporting
organizations, and created the disfavored status of the non-functionally
integrated Type III supporting organization.93 The legislation defined the
relationships of each type of supporting organization, and directed the IRS

87

I.R.C. § 501(r).

88

Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 9007(c).

89

I.R.C. § 509(a)(3).

90

I.R.C. § 1.509(a)-4(f), (g), (h), (j) (2012); see also Supporting Organizations—Requirements and
Types (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/
Supporting-Organizations-Requirements-and-Types.
91
See, e.g., IRS Commissioner Testimony: Charitable Giving Problems and Best Practices:
Hearing on Charitable Giving Problems and Best Practices Before the S. Committee on Finance, 108th
Cong. (2004) (written statement of Mark W. Everson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue), available at https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081.pdf.
92

Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 1241–1245, 120 Stat. 780, 1102–1108.

93

Id. § 1241, 120 Stat. at 1103.
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and the Secretary of the Treasury to enact regulations directing a nonfunctionally integrated Type III supporting organization to pay a significant
amount to its publically supported organization(s).94
The legislation prohibits any supporting organization from making a
“grant, loan, payment of compensation, or other similar payment to a
substantial contributor (or person related to the substantial contributor).”95
The legislation prohibits the supporting organization from loaning money to
any person who controls the supporting organization.96 In order to alert a
supported organization about its supporting organizations, the legislation
requires a supporting organization to file an annual information return and to
identify all of its supported organizations.97 In addition, the statute requires a
Type III supporting organization to provide notice directly to its supported
organizations.98 Congress also imposed an excise tax on non-functionally
integrated type III supporting organizations called the tax on excess business
holdings.99 This excise tax limits the amount of stock a private foundation,
and now a non-functionally integrated Type III supporting organization, can
hold when that stock is also held by the donor and translates into significant
control over a for-profit corporation.100 Finally, the legislation included a
number of provisions that do not appear to have any particular coherence.101
Those include: (1) Type III supporting organizations may not support foreign
organizations;102 and (2) Type I and Type III supporting organizations may

94
Id.; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-38-06, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE
“PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS CONSIDERED
BY THE SENATE ON AUG. 3, 2006 (2006).
95

I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3); Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1242, 120 Stat. 780,

96

I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3); Pension Protection Act § 1242.

97

I.R.C. § 6033(l).

98

Id. § 509(f)(1)(A).

99

Id. § 4943(f).

1104.

100

Id. § 4943.

101

Congress might have in these instances legislated by anecdote rather than actual reality. That
was the case with several of the private foundation rules enacted in 1969. See Thomas Troyer, The 1969
Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspective on Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 52 (2000).
102

I.R.C. § 509(f)(1)(B).
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not receive a gift or contribution from someone who controls their supported
organizations.103
E. Concluding Thoughts
Each of these pieces of legislation is different. However, they bear
significant similarities. Each takes a rule-oriented approach to a specific
narrow segment of the charitable organization world. Additionally, fear of
abuse of the charitable sector motivated Congress to act. Is this rule-based
statutory effort by Congress for narrow segments of the charitable
organization population wise or foolish?
III. RULES V. STANDARDS LITERATURE
This Part considers the literature regarding rules and standards. A
common theme of the recent exempt organization legislation identified is that
it is predominately rule-based rather than standard-based. Thus, this part
considers the factors to be assessed in determining whether rules or standards
are preferable.
A. Rules and Standards
“A system of rules is often thought to be the signal virtue of a system of
law.”104 At their best, rules eliminate the tyranny of the arbitrary acts of
unelected bureaucrats against individuals they just do not like.105 Where
standards reign, the argument goes, a biased agent can hide behind discretion.
With true rules, discretion is circumscribed. More important, perhaps, under
a legislative rule-based system, the people of the democracy choose the law
they are to be governed by, rather than allowing unelected bureaucrats to
choose their law. Rules bring stability and certainty. They also make it easier

103
Id. § 509(f)(2). It is not at all clear why, if this requirement were appropriate, it would not also
apply to Type II Supporting Organizations.
104

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 968.

105

Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1688.
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for people to cooperate for mutual gain because they know the consequences
of their actions before they act.106
However, rules are costly to enact, are not well fitted to all
circumstances, and often miss their mark of an aim at justice. Furthermore, a
standard arguably allows us to come closer to justice in enforcing our laws.107
A legislature that enacts a standard recognizes the limits of its ability to use
language in a detailed manner to express how every situation should be
governed. The standard provides flexibility to an adjudicator to achieve
justice.
What is a rule and what is a standard? For purposes of this article, a rule
is a legal pronouncement that allows individuals to know ex-ante whether
they will violate a law.108 With a standard, the lawmaker enacts a provision
that guides people in their actions, but typically the final answer is not known
until after adjudication. At its simplest, a rule decides a legal matter ex-ante,
while a standard decides a matter ex-post.109 This is simplistic of course. As
we will see below, standards often operate in rule form. Although a standard
is ostensibly in place, many still know actions that will fall inside or outside
the standard. Similarly, many rules leave much room for discretion after the
fact.
A classic example of the difference between a rule and a standard is a
law that prohibits driving over 55 miles per hour versus a law that prohibits
driving at an unsafe speed. The first is a rule, while the latter is a standard.
We do not know whether we have violated the unsafe speed standard until a
judge decides. Conversely, we know ex-ante whether we have violated a 55
miles per hour speed limit even before the cop stops us.
The difference between a rule and a standard is not stark. It is probably
best to think of them along a continuum. Rules leave discretion to the
adjudicator, and standards can apply in rule-like fashion. A policeman may
exceed a 55 miles per hour speed limit. Someone driving a pregnant woman
to the hospital to deliver a baby may also exceed a 55 miles per hour speed
limit. An adjudicator would likely apply a reasonableness exception in both

106

SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 32; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1688.

107

Coenen, supra note 5.

108

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 961.

109

Kaplow, supra note 5, at 559–60.
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instances even if a lawmaker did not detail such rules ex-ante. Thus, we see
this simple rule has standard like qualities. And, as noted, standards can
operate like rules. If a particular community understands that the standard
prohibiting driving at an unsafe speed means that driving faster than 55 miles
per hour is unsafe, then this standard operates like a rule.
B. Problem of Underinclusiveness/Overinclusiveness
It can be very difficult to develop good rules.110 The rulemaker must
possess all of the current and future information needed. While finding good
current information can present significant challenges, knowing or predicting
the future is impossible. For instance, designing rules for information
technology is particularly challenging because of its technical and rapidly
changing nature.111 Rules in such an environment can quickly become
anachronistic.112
This feature of rules, the inability of the rule to consistently match the
justification that led to the development of the rule, is referred to as a rule
being both overinclusive and underinclusive. By overinclusive, we mean that
the rule prohibits some activity that the rationale of the rule cannot justify.
Thus, a requirement to drive 55 miles per hour that did not take into
consideration the needs of police to sometimes break that rule would be
overinclusive. By underinclusive, we mean that the rule does not prohibit
some activity it should prohibit. For instance, a 55 miles per hour speed limit
would not stop bad drivers who do drive 55 but are unable to drive at that
speed in a safe manner.
Rules tend to be transparent because they use terms that we all
understand.113 However, rules are based on generalizations.114 A rule
operates based on probability that a certain factual predicate will lead to a
result that we may believe is just or not just. But, the factual predicate will

110

Lee, supra note 5; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 992.

111

Lee, supra note 5.

112

Sunstein, supra note 5, at 993.

113

Diver, supra note 5, at 72.

114

SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 32.
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be wrong in some circumstances because it is based on a generalization. This
will result in not sanctioning undesirable behavior and sanctioning some
desirable behavior.115 For instance, someone might prohibit dogs from
entering a restaurant because they will cause problems for patrons.116
However, there might be some particularly well-trained dogs or seeing-eye
dogs to which this rule should not apply. The rule would be overinclusive
because it would be written to prohibit some instances where its justification
does not apply. It might also be wrong in an underinclusive way by failing to
prohibit activity that it should prohibit. Perhaps it fails to properly exclude
unruly humans who cause similar disturbances.
Consider a rule providing that anyone over 60 years old may not be an
airline pilot.117 The general point of such a rule would be to stop individuals
from piloting airplanes once they have lost the ability to operate an aircraft
in a safe manner. This is a very simple rule to enforce, but it may end some
pilot’s careers too soon, and not soon enough for others. There are efficiency
losses and gains in that tradeoff.
Sometimes a simple rule that raises problems of underinclusiveness and
overinclusiveness, though, can be a very effective means for a regulatory
agency that is understaffed to efficiently manage its caseload. Even though
the rule may not be perfect, it can be easier to administer than a standard, and
can promote certainty. Overwhelmed agencies often need simple rules to
make decisions quickly, efficiently, and without great cost. Conforming to
this expectation, agencies with particularly crowded dockets tend to have the
clearest rules.118
However, rules in this sense can also have unintended effects. If the rule
is so disconnected from justice, it may be hard for the agency to enforce that
rule.119 Under that circumstance, an agency may even explicitly choose to not

115
See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1695; Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 268 (1974); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 36 (2000).
116
See SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 32 (providing the example of the rationale behind the prohibition
of dogs entering restaurants).
117
Diver, supra note 5, at 69 (developing this example regarding regulating the forced retirement
of airline pilots).
118

Id. at 75.

119

See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 994–95.
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enforce that law. An agency might conclude it does not have a sufficient
political constituency to support that law, and avoid placing itself in a
politically untenable spot. There is a strict rule that applies to charitable
organizations: no inurement allowed. This is widely accepted to mean that if
even one penny goes to an insider of a charitable organization, the charitable
organization will lose its status. The IRS almost never enforces this rule
because it seems unduly harsh. Congress enacted a rule that allows the IRS
to impose a tax on less egregious forms of inurement now to try to handle
this disconnect between the rule and IRS enforcement. Although not as
clearly a rule, many complain today that the IRS does not sufficiently enforce
political campaign activity limits on social welfare organizations. However,
after the Tea Party episode, the IRS is likely afraid that it does not have the
political constituency to safely enforce that rule. Thus, while there may be a
rule that the IRS is supposed to enforce, it may choose not to enforce that
rule because of the bad fit between the rule and the particular situation.
Professor Zelenak considers this problem.120 He points out the oddity of
the IRS’s income treatment of frequent flyer miles earned by an employee
while working for a company. While we can question whether the concept of
income in the Code is a rule, many experts consider frequent flyer miles to
be income for purposes of the income tax. In other words, even though the
concept of income might be considered a standard, the tax community has
allowed it to operate in rule form to include within its definition these
frequent flyer miles earned by employees. Yet the IRS does not treat frequent
flyer miles as income from an employer for enforcement purposes.121 While
administratively, this might make sense, it comes with serious and obvious
rule of law problems.122 Although the IRS is directed to enforce the law in a
particular way, where the IRS feels uncomfortable in enforcing a rule, it

120
Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62
DUKE L.J. 829 (2012).
121
Id. at 831; cf. Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX. REV.
295, 336 n.150 (2011) (arguing that an interpretation such as what happened in the case of frequent flyer
miles is not a violation of the law, but simply a practical interpretation of the meaning of income for
purposes of the federal income tax).
122

Zelenak, supra note 120, at 851.
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apparently sometimes chooses not to enforce that law.123 And no one can
challenge that choice.
C. Optimal Social Welfare Analysis of a Rule or a Standard?
Kaplow suggests a helpful way to think about whether to enact a rule or
a standard. The question is whether information “should be gathered and
processed before or after individual’s act.”124 It is more costly to implement
a rule at the legislative stage because of the informational costs. With a
standard, the drafter need not anticipate all problems. Nevertheless, a
standard is more costly both to individuals trying to comply, and to
adjudicators interpreting that standard. In general, both the complying
individual (before the act) and the adjudicator (after the act) need to seek
more information under a standard than under a rule. Because of the expected
extra informational cost under a standard, an individual will be less likely to
comply with a standard than with the less-costly rule. The adjudicator also
will need to typically spend a greater amount of time with a standard than
with a rule because under the standard the judge must both determine the
relevant facts and how those facts interact with the standard.
Based on the basic principle that information costs are different at
different points in the rulemaking process, Kaplow builds a social welfare
cost benefit model to analyze rules and standards. The model suggests that
where a law will apply to many repeated acts, a rule is generally preferable.125
However, where a law will apply to only a few acts, a standard is likely
preferable.126 The costs and benefits include the costs of generating
information at the different stages, and the likelihood of generating a legal
command that will influence citizen behavior in the most optimal manner. If
an act will repeat often, legislative rules will likely reduce total costs.
Additionally, citizens are more likely to inform themselves about a rule than

123
In § 1001, Congress defines the concept of amount realized to include money plus the fair market
value of property. The IRS arguably includes in this amount realized also the value of services transferred
in order to make the system work. This almost certainly was the intent of Congress, but the IRS is clearly
going beyond the strict terms of the rule.
124

Kaplow, supra note 5, at 585.

125

Id. at 584–85.

126

Id. at 585.
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they are about a standard. Where there are few acts, it is likely more costly
to develop rules for those relatively few acts. The total costs and likelihood
of a small group informing themselves about the law is likely not as important
as a much larger group, unless of course there is a great amount of money at
stake.
For Kaplow, there is a continuum of rules and of standards that run from
simple to complex.127 Kaplow contends that most analysts mistakenly
compare a simple rule against a complex standard. This comparison
inevitably, he argues, returns a judgment in favor of the complex standard.
The simple rule is likely to be both overinclusive and underinclusive. At the
same time, we all can envision how the complex standard will lead to the
correct result. The simple rule typically loses to the complex standard
because of concerns of justice. Kaplow asserts that this analysis is too
simplistic.128 He recommends, therefore, that the analyst considering the
rules standards question take into consideration the possibility of simple
rules, complex rules, simple standards, and complex standards.
A simple rule is one that has few exceptions. For instance, a simple rule
in the case of airline pilots might be that a pilot must retire at 60 years old. A
more complex rule might employ many exceptions to a simple rule to put
into rule form all of the considerations we would hope a judge might consider
to get justice right for the particular circumstance. A complex rule in the
airline pilot context might establish a requirement that once a pilot turns 58,
he must undergo a battery of tests assessing vision, hand-eye coordination,
and physical and mental fitness. A pilot could maintain his work until he
became unable to pass that battery of tests. Different weight could be given
to each particular factor.
A simple standard conversely might consist of only one or two factors.
Such a standard would likely operate in a rule-like manner. In the pilot
context, the standard might require pilots to retire when they can no longer
safely fly a plane. In the case of that simple standard, it might be that all the
adjudicators look at one factor: age. They might adopt a rule that at age 60 a
pilot no longer has the ability to operate a plane at a high degree of safety. In
this case, we would have a simple standard operating like a simple rule.

127

Id. at 566.

128

Id.
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Finally, a complex standard admits of many factors, none of which is
determinative. In the pilot context, this might mean that the adjudicator is
directed to consider the pilot’s mental and physical health, dexterity, and age,
along with the type of planes the pilot is flying and the conditions under
which he files to determine whether the pilot can continue to fly.
This conception of the rules versus standards debate allows a more
sophisticated comparison. A complex rule could be superior to a simple
standard that also manages to be both underinclusive and overinclusive.
Conversely, although a standard is often thought to allow the adjudicator to
come closer to justice, where a standard results in inconsistent results in
adjudication, a deterministic rule may very well be superior to this
randomized standard. In the complex environment that charitable
organizations present these guides could prove helpful in analyzing the best
course to take.
While it seems to be Kaplow’s sense that complex rules are generally
better than complex standards, some disagree, at least within certain contexts.
Professor Weisbach argues that complex rules create more complexity in
certain systems and thus can be more costly overall than a complex
standard.129 The intuition here is that once a rulemaker has chosen complex
rules to govern a field, the rulemaker must anticipate all the ways in which
those rules might be abused. The need to respond to every possible abuse in
a rule-based system leads to both greater complexity and cost. This leads
Weisbach to the conclusion that in the case of tax law standard-based antiabuse rules are much more economical than detailed rules.130
The drafters of the income tax often face the challenge of combatting
the uncommon situation. Taxpayers regularly obtain a better tax result than
the one Congress intended by modestly changing the form of a transaction.
A rule-based system has to predict and handle each of those circumstances.
If the law does not govern each of the uncommon circumstances, the
uncommon can become common in a complex rule system. On the
reasonable assumption that the uncommon situation will not occur often,
adjudicators considering a complex standard only need provide the rule form
for a much smaller subset of uncommon situations than would need the

129

Weisbach, supra note 7, at 862.

130

Id.
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legislature enacting the complex rule.131 Thus in a cost/benefit sense, the
complex standard comes off as less costly. Given the complexity and
uncommon nature, the complex standard likely shapes behavior as much as
the complex rule. Also, in a realistic sense, the complex standard might be
the only way to handle some situations because of the impossibility of
knowing all the necessary information before the unusual circumstance takes
place.
As rules are enacted to manage each problematic uncommon situation
the complex rule system becomes more complex. A more complex system
becomes in many cases easier to abuse because it is more difficult to enforce.
This complexity in turn hinders efficiency. Weisbach claims that in most
instances you should still want rules in tax because of the great frequency of
most taxable transactions.132 However, a standard is likely a less complex
way to handle the policing of the edges of a complex rule. With a standard
guarding the edges, adjudicators will only have to review and decide upon
perhaps ten unusual circumstances rather than the 100 that a rule-based
system might spend time and cost generating.133
Weisbach believes that rules are generally the right place for most of tax
law, but he believes that anti-abuse rules work quite well as standards. He
notes that there are real costs associated with creating a complex system of
rules. As rules increase, rule interactions increase at the square of the number
of rules.134 Thus, as the rulemaker designs a rule-based system to anticipate
every possible means of avoiding the general rule, the complexity to the
system increases exponentially. In the case where there are many uncommon
ways around a particular tax rule, a standard can limit the amount of rule
interactions by keeping the uncommon rules to a minimum.
Despite Weisbach’s cogent critique, viewing the matter of rules versus
standards as a matter of gathering and disseminating information provides a
useful means of assessing this age-old debate. It also opens up possibilities
for analyzing a situation where rules could be made at different levels such

131

Id. at 867.

132

Id. at 876.

133

Id. at 872; see Adam Chodorow, Agricultural Tithing and (Flat Tax) Complexity, 68 U. PITT. L.
REV. 267 (2006).
134

Weisbach, supra note 7, at 871.
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as the case of tax law where either Congress could pass rules or it could wait
and allow the IRS to implement rules at the agency level.
D. Values Approach
Some scholars suggest there is no scientific method to determine
whether rules or standards are ideal to a particular circumstance. There are
simply too many factors involved. They adopt what I refer to as a valuesoriented approach that uses rules of thumb to choose between rules and
standards. For instance, Professor Diver suggests that when trying to decide
between a rule or a standard the rulemaker should consider three factors:
transparency, accessibility, and congruency.135 While Diver is aiming in part
for efficiency through these factors, he uses these factors to assess certain
iconic legal environments where he indicates we should value one of those
three factors more over another. Professor Sunstein also uses this values
approach. He focuses on questions of democracy and circumstances under
which rules or standards are more likely to be successful at achieving
democracy.
Diver provides a means to judge the quality of administrative
rulemaking. Does it lack specificity or is it too rigid? He uses his three factors
of transparency, accessibility and congruency to consider various legal
environments. By transparency Diver means law that people can
understand.136 By accessibility, Diver means that the law is applicable to
concrete, real-world situations.137 Finally, congruency refers to how well the
law matches justification to application.138 In other words, congruency is a
measure of the extent of overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness. For Diver
there is no one answer to the question of whether rules or standards are better.
However, he suggests that the rulemaker should evaluate these three factors
to make the most informed choice. By pushing a law more toward one factor,

135

Diver, supra note 5, at 67.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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the rule maker will typically be pushing the rule away from the other two
factors.139
Diver provides rules of thumb for situations rules might be superior to
standards or vice versa. For instance, he suggests that on the one hand,
internal agency law is typically served better by standards.140 Congruence
tends to be highly important in running an agency—the agency wants to
ensure its resources are being utilized wisely.141 On the other hand, external
rules that the agency administers are more likely to be aided by being stated
in rule form142 where factors of transparency and accessibility are likely to
be more important. As an example, Diver suggests that the proper allocation
of agency resources can be a real challenge; thus, rough standards will likely
serve the agency administrators better than explicit rules in allocating those
scarce resources.143 However, courts typically require external rules
regarding investigative functions to be more transparent.144
He also compares sanctioning rules with liability rules.145 There, Diver
finds that punishment tends to be less transparent, while criminal rules tend
to be more precise.146 Compliance tends to be particularly important in law
regarding liability for acts. Thus, rulemakers should strive for transparency
in crafting laws regarding liability in order to obtain greater levels of
compliance. The rulemaker crafting sanctioning rules, however, is trying to
accomplish many different goals such as punishing in a manner measured to
the crime and deterrence.147 These different goals make achieving

139

Id. at 70.

140

Id. at 76.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 77.
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Id. at 78.
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transparency quite tough.148 Congruence is likely a more important goal in
these situations.
Finally, Diver compares licensure schemes with prohibitory rules.149
This final comparison is probably the most useful analogue to charitable
organization oversight because the primary activity of the IRS is a licensing
system. Diver argues that licensing systems are typically highly complex in
nature and less susceptible to the use of rules.150 While direct prohibitions or
commands can typically be stated in clear, transparent language, licensing
systems must provide a broad sense of permission based on a large number
of undefined complex factors; they are thus more difficult to express as
rules.151 Based on the fact that excluding someone from a licensing scheme
typically comes with large costs to the loser, Diver comes down in favor of
aiming for congruency, and therefore standards, in most of these regimes.152
However, in the situation where there is small cost lost and a large volume
of cases, he is more inclined to give up a bit on congruence and go more for
transparency and accessibility.153
Professor Sunstein also employs a values oriented approach.154 To
Sunstein, the debate pits congruence with ideal law against unfettered
discretion to unelected judges and bureaucrats.155 Sunstein examines the
values that rules promote: equal treatment, minimal informational costs of
decisions, and predictability for private actors. He also considers the main
arguments against rules such as that they are both overinclusive and
underinclusive, they can actually mask bias, and they allow evasion by
wrongdoers.
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Id.
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Id. at 79.
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Sunstein’s primary goal is to resurrect in a sense case-by-case justice to
show that rule of law goals can be met by some relaxation of a requirement
for rules.156 Sunstein builds his case for modestly straying from a rule-based
system on the premise that people in a democracy should have a right to
particularistic judgment of their particular case.157 He argues that we have a
tradition in our legal system of allowing legitimate rule revisions and that
this tradition is quite democratic.158 Embracing that tradition in proper places
can be democratic enhancing rather than harming.
Finally, like Diver, Sunstein encourages a close look at the
circumstances in which laws are being erected.159 Different contexts demand
different types of legal structures. He believes that it is possible to size up
different matters and get a sense of whether rules or standards are generally
going to be preferable. Sunstein looks at many of the same factors that Diver
and Kaplow and others considered. At the end he notes that there can be no
rule that makes the determination, but it must be a question of factors that we
consider. Those include: “the likelihood of bias, the extent of current
information, the location and nature of social disagreement, the stakes, the
risk of overinclusiveness, the quality of those who apply the law, the
alignment or nonalignment of views between lawmakers and others, the
sheer number of cases.”160
IV. RULES OR STANDARDS FOR CHARITABLE TAX LAW?
Requiring an organization to operate for a “charitable purpose” is
obviously a standard. But, perhaps more importantly, this is a standard that
is quite difficult to make into a rule. There likely is no set of optimal rules
for determining which organizations should be granted charitable tax-exempt
status. It is also highly unlikely that some ideal notion exists in the law
implemented by Congress. Further, as discussed above, the nature of
“charitable” is a concept that changes over time because it depends on the
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Id. at 958.
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Id. at 1008.
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Id. at 1012.
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Id. at 1016.
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moral proclivity of society today along with its needs.161 In light of these
challenges, is it possible to develop good rules to govern charitable
organizations in the tax realm? Even if it is difficult, might there be reasons
of stability and certainty and efficiency to provide imperfect rules?
Furthermore, if rules are desired, in what situation are they desired, and who
is the best institutional player to draft those rules?
The first part reviews a couple of recent attempts to determine whether
rules or standards are more appropriate for one part of the tax-exempt law:
political activity prohibitions. It next turns to the reality that it is difficult to
write rules regarding charitable organizations because of the complexity of
that regime. Section C applies both the Kaplow analysis and the values
approach to examine the charitable tax-exempt organization legal
environment. Section D considers who should develop the rules and what
form those rules should take.
A. Former Rules/Standards Analyses Applied to the Charitable Sector
Two scholars recently each provided assessments of the rules and
standards debate as it applies to a narrow rule in the charitable and social
welfare tax-exempt organization’s context.162 Professor Aprill reviewed the
rule that prohibits a charitable organization from intervening in a political
campaign, and Professor Mueller reviewed the very similar rule in the social
welfare organization context. Because this law presents many of the
challenges that charitable organization tax law presents generally, this
section reviews their analyses first. Do they have broader implications for the
charitable sector?
Aprill uses Kaplow’s optimal analysis to assess whether rules or
standards are better to implement the prohibition on political campaign

161
E.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (stating that although schools that
discriminated on the basis of race were clearly charitable under the Code when the initial Internal Revenue
laws were established, because of changing societal public policy, that was no longer the case by the
1970s).
162
Ellen Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want to Develop Rules on Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 643, 647 (2012); Jennifer Mueller, Defending Nuance in an Era of Tea Party Politics: An
Argument for the Continued Use of Standards to Evaluate the Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)
Organizations, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 103 (2014).
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intervention.163 Because there is a very low level of enforcement of this
prohibition, standards would normally be best under the Kaplow analysis.
However, there is a competing value involved. Where many are subject to a
command and there is low enforcement, rules may be best. Rules can ensure
the desired norm is understood and followed. Furthermore, where the groups
that are subject to the command are small, unsophisticated organizations, as
is the case with the vast majority of the charitable sector, there might be a
real need for simple rules because these can be easier for the unsophisticated
to seek out, understand, and follow.164
Aprill notes that there is no agreed-upon norm regarding whether or
what political campaign intervention should be restricted; this makes it
difficult to draft rules.165 For instance, some believe a charity’s political
speech should be restricted to maintain tax-exempt status; others believe the
First Amendment protects a charitable organization’s right to engage in all
political speech.166 Aprill argues that this lack of a norm actually augurs in
favor of rules.167 Rules could help both legislators and organizations move
closer to a legal norm and provide greater stability where instability currently
lies. It is likely that some organizations engage in more political speech than
they should and that some organizations engage in less than they could. This
creates inefficiency, and rules could work to limit these harms Aprill
contends.168
Aprill recognizes Weisbach’s concern that aggressive taxpayers can and
do abuse tax rules and that under certain circumstances adopting rules to
manage these problems can make the tax system more costly.169 Aprill finds
though that the anti-abuse concerns typical to tax law are not prevalent in
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Aprill, supra note 162.
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Id. at 669.
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Id. at 671.
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Cf. Parks v. Comm’r, Nos. 7043-07, 7093-7, 145 T.C. No. 12 (Nov. 17, 2015) (upholding the
political campaign limitations on charitable private foundations under the First Amendment).
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political campaign intervention; thus, standards are not to be favored here for
anti-abuse reasons.170
In the end, Aprill finds that the factors weigh in favor of a more robust
rule-based regime.171 Of particular importance is that many unsophisticated
taxpayers are trying to abide by important rules that implicate free speech. In
this circumstance, rules can bring about more compliant behavior and likely
lead to more equitable treatment to all taxpayers.
Professor Mueller reviews a similar set of laws related to political
speech prohibitions in the context of § 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations.172 While exempt from federal income tax, contributors may
not deduct contributions to social welfare organizations as charitable
contributions.173 Although presented with a related law, Mueller comes to the
exact opposite conclusion of Aprill. She argues that given the complexity of
the regime, only standards really make sense. Mueller also believes the great
possibility for circumvention in this area militates for a standard based
regime.174 In particular, she marshals evidence that uncertainty can actually
increase compliance rather than decrease it.175 Furthermore, Mueller notes
that low enforcement of the command and misalignment of the penalty for
violating the campaign prohibition pushes towards a conclusion that
standards are better here.176 Finally, looking at the challenges that the FEC
faces in enforcement of election laws even with rules, Mueller argues that the
political challenge of passing rules that will not generate new enforcement
costs are too great.177 Enforcement costs will continue whether there are rules
or not.
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Id. at 678.
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Mueller, supra note 162.
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Thus, in assessing one small part of the current standard-based regime
regarding charitable or social welfare organizations, we see conflicting
opinion on whether rules or standards are better. Of course, that makes sense
regarding politics, an issue that brings a significant difference of opinion. Is
it any different when we turn to the basic rules of being a charitable
organization?
B. Challenges in Rulifying the Charitable Norm
Why might the concept of a charitable organization be so hard to nail
down in a satisfying, stable manner? First, the concept of charitable has
multiple rationales and it changes over time because of changes in society
and technology.178 This makes settling on the rules at the legislative stage
difficult and costly. Secondly, the idea of charitable is applied to the concept
of organization. Not only is there a quantifying aspect relative to acts and
time, there is an attribution complexity.179 Finally, there is the difficulty that
almost any type of activity, whether it be surfing or cooking or
manufacturing, can be accomplished in a charitable manner. This final point
means that the permutations of possible charitable organizations are likely
infinite.
As discussed in Part II.A, there are likely a number of congressional
rationales for the charitable tax-exempt regime. It may: (1) provide a subsidy
for organizations that provide an equivalent public benefit, (2) regulate
charitable organizations, and (3) enhance pluralism. These different
purposes, almost certainly point in different directions at times. A legislator
or an adjudicator may find himself confused as to which purpose to place
first or even primary. Additionally, if charitable tax law is intended to support
the value of pluralism, it is likely that only a standard can accomplish this
goal. Pluralism is an idea that suggests our government works best when

178

There is certainly a laymen’s conception of charity that it is aid to the poor alone. However, that
is definitely not consistent with the conception Congress adopted or that the IRS implements or with the
idea of charitable within the charitable trust law context.
179
See, e.g., Presbyterian & Reformed Pub. Co. v. Comm’r, 743 F.2d 148, 155 (1984) (noting the
great difficulty of determining intent of a party, but the even greater challenge with determining intent
with respect to a corporation). Admittedly, the problem of attribution is faced in any legal system that
must deal with legal entities.
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groups promote all the different interests in our society. It suggests that we
as a country should value diversity. As Justice Powell suggested in Bob Jones
University, we should be hesitant to create a charitable tax law to enforce the
status quo.180 Charitable tax law should instead promote a range of diverse
ideas. If we want to promote new ideas, a rule-oriented regime is quite likely
to restrict those new ideas before they even arise.
The fact that there are at least three purposes to the law can lead to
different directions for the rules. Some laws might be designed to identify
organizations that should not pay tax, while others might be more focused on
regulating charitable organizations. For instance, the recent legislation on
credit counseling and hospitals discussed in this Article seems to be
motivated largely by the second purpose rather than the first. In this
legislation, Congress is interested in regulating the charitable sector rather
than in directly determining organizations that are worthy of tax exemption
or not. Some of these provisions might have looked different if the tax base
were the only consideration.
Additionally, concepts subject to great social variability are difficult to
turn into rules. For example, the concept of obscenity is commonly
understood to be nearly impossible to express with clarity; instead, we know
it when we see it.181 Part of the difficulty of expression is that it changes over
time with changes in culture and community. This means that a standard may
be required to solve such a legal problem. The concept of “charitable” is quite
similar. While it is a broad, expansive notion with deep history rooted in
English law,182 it is based in community notions of what is good. The
meaning of charitable purpose thus changes with some regularity.183
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Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 606 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
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Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Judge Stewart stating: “I shall not today attempt
further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description
[‘hard-core pornography’]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when
I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”).
182
See Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. ch. 4 (1601); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1983) (discussing long history of the idea of charitable purpose).
183
The IRS at one time did not accept that joint ventures were possible between a charitable
organization and a for profit organization. But today, it fully accepts them. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1
C.B. 718. Donor Advised Funds were also generally prohibited, but today Congress has implemented a
regime to fully accept them. Although in both instances the IRS was forced into these positions by courts
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In Bob Jones University v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court explicitly
recognized the changing nature of the charitable standard.184 Although
discrimination on the basis of race was widely accepted by Congress in 1913
when the Income Tax was enacted, the Court held that discrimination on the
basis now violated a fundamental public policy.185 This example illustrates
how society can change its mind regarding the nature of a charitable purpose.
Many changes in charitable purpose take place as a result of changes in
technology, law, and society. For instance, the changes in the activities and
the character of hospitals from the start of tax-exemption in 1913 (when there
were mostly almshouses to serve as hospitals)186 to today (when gigantic
health systems with large insurance components roam the United States) are
dramatic.187 Even the hospitals that qualified in 1969 look quite different than
they do today in 2015.188 The development of Medicare and Medicaid and
the significant changes in health care law and financing played a large role
in those dramatic changes. In that time, the IRS has had to assess the
charitable nature of many different models of healthcare delivery.189
These changes are found throughout the charitable sector. As one
Treasury Department research paper noted, “[o]ne reason that there have
been few attempts to provide a comprehensive definition [of charity] is that

and Congress, these do still arguably reflect a change in societal views. The IRS certainly is not the definer
of social norms, but only an interpreter in attempting to oversee charitable tax-exempt law.
184

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

185

Id.

186

Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a
Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 318 (1991).
187

See IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).

188

Compare the proto-typical hospitals considered in Rev. Rul. 69-545 with the complex system
reviewed in IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188. On the one hand, the standard to consider
these cases was the same, but on the other, the financial and management complexity considered in IHC
health systems was vastly different than the brick and mortar hospital considered in 1969. See also JAMES
J. FISHMAN ET AL., TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 84 (4th ed. 2015) (discussing the change
in the IRS position from a relief of poverty rationale to a community benefit standard).
189
For example, most recently the IRS had to determine how to treat Regional Health Information
Organizations that maintain electronic health care records for a large region: Regional Health Information
Organization (RHIO) Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 8, 2015), http://
www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Regional-Health-InformationOrganization-(RHIO)-Frequently-Asked-Questions.
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charitable activity constantly changes, and formulating a definition is
extremely difficult when the object to be defined is in flux.”190 While some
things stay the same, such as pure assistance to the poor, or most full-time
schools, there are real changes in types of organizations that the IRS reviews
today from what it reviewed in the past. Few newspapers sought charitable
status in the past. However, today, newspapers are more and more
considering the charitable model as a possible solution to the difficulties of
the news market.191 Law schools might also begin using the charitable model
to develop a new legal training model inside a training law firm.192
Whether, our social notion of charitable changed on each of these
matters, or it changed to accommodate technical change, does not matter.
Also, whether society changed its mind, or the IRS implemented new
guidance creating that change, does not matter. Because of value and
technical change, our notion of charitable in healthcare provision is quite
different today than it was back in the 1950s. This change makes it difficult
to write legislative rules that cover the legislative intent on ideal charitable
law. Rules can be written of course, but they are likely to miss many
important differences in social value change, and technological and
organizational change.
The application of the charitable purpose standard to an organization is
highly complex too. Section 501(c)(3) seems to imply that whether an
organization qualifies depends on every act of the organization during any
particular taxable year. The standard of “organized and operated exclusively
for a” charitable purpose strongly suggests this; furthermore, the idea of a
charitable purpose implies such an all-encompassing notion as well. For
instance, in Revenue Ruling 69-545, the IRS was called on to determine
whether Hospital A was operated for a charitable purpose. The IRS
considered all of the contracts of the hospital, all of the acts of people who
governed the organization, and generally considered the complete operation

190

Persons et al., supra note 40, at 1943.

191

See Richard Schmalbeck, Financing the American Newspaper in the Twenty-First Century, 35
VT. L. REV. 251 (2010).
192
See Adam Chodorow & Philip T. Hackney, Post-Graduate Legal Training, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC.
___ (forthcoming 2016).
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of the hospital in all of its facets from the emergency room to the operation
of its laundry. It did this because the law demands such an analysis.
If the law required an organization to “operate exclusively for an exempt
purpose,” any one bad fact could take an organization out of charitable status.
Such an interpretation could have been a time saver for the IRS. However,
the IRS interpreted that requirement to mean that an organization qualifies if
it “primarily engages in activities,” that accomplish such an exempt
purpose.193 This means, in a practical sense, that the IRS must review almost
every act of the organization during the year so that it can quantify whether
the organization is organized and operated primarily for a charitable purpose.
Any charitable tax rule needs to take into consideration this significantly
factually complex environment.
Also, challenging is the need for the IRS to attribute actions of
employees and volunteers to the nonprofit entity. To determine the acts of a
nonprofit entity, the IRS must evaluate who acts for the entity.194 The
difficulty of this challenge can be seen in the IRS’s attempt to review whether
All Saints Episcopal Church might have violated the prohibition on
intervention in a political campaign. In that case, a visiting minister spoke
before the church and arguably advocated for the election of John Kerry and
against the election of George Bush in the 2004 presidential election.195 The
question was whether a visiting minister could be considered to be acting on
behalf of the church when he spoke before the group, such that his advocacy
could be considered prohibited political intervention on the part of the
church. This same matter is seen again and again in much more mundane
situations. This extra layer makes rulemaking again subject to more
complexity in charitable tax law.
Admittedly, anyone reviewing the acts of an entity for legal purposes is
presented with the same problem. However, in the realm of tax, I contend
that this factor is exacerbated a bit more in the charitable organization context

193

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (as amended in 2014) (italics added).

194

See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-4 C.B. 1421 (in situations 3–6, the IRS examines whether
charitable organization leaders are acting in their own capacity or as capacity of the leader of an
organization for purposes of political activity).
195

Rebecca Trounson, IRS Ends Church Probe but Stirs New Questions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/24/local/me-allsaints24.
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because of the overwhelming subjective nature of the judgment regarding the
acts that must be made.
Ultimately, determining whether an organization is charitable is a
different activity than determining whether a single transaction is taxable.
This problem is the same as that identified by Diver regarding the difference
between creating prohibitory rules and license systems.196 The latter are
necessarily more complex and much harder to turn into rules. The point is
that whether any organization is charitable is likely to be sui generis. This
means that obtaining our ideal rule will be very costly because it is highly
complex.
A legislature could try to solve this second challenge through rules that
require certain quantities of money or work-time to be dedicated to some
narrowly defined activities that the legislature deems to be charitable.
Congress has tried this solution in part with respect to private foundations.197
These charitable organizations are required to meet a highly complex payout
requirement that only those with sophisticated tax counsel should attempt.198
Although the system does not define charitable acts, it does define the
quantity of acts an organization must perform during the year to be
considered charitable. In other words, the private foundation rules are a
solution in part to the second problematic issue identified in this section.
However, this regime is so complex that most organizations cannot afford
the costs of complying with the rules.
Now the close reader might be saying, “He can’t be arguing that taxexempt charitable law is so complex that it is more complex than the tax law
itself. If that were the case, then Congress should simply erect standards
throughout the Code. Surely, you don’t intend to make that argument?” First,
it is perfectly legitimate and in fact advisable for Congress to enact rules in
the Code. However, why argue that for the Code generally, but not so much

196

See supra Part III.D.

197

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4940–4946.

198

Id. §§ 4941–4942. Consider that Mark and Chan Zuckerberg recently eschewed the private
foundation model even though they are planning to donate a reported $45 billion in Facebook stock. Many
have suggested that the reason that they might avoid private foundation rules is that they are too costly,
restrictive, and complex. Kerry Dolan, Mark Zuckerberg Explains Why the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative
Isn’t a Charitable Foundation, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2015), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kerryadolan/2015/12/04/mark-zuckerberg-explains-why-the-chan-zuckerberg-initiative-isnt-acharitable-foundation/.
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when it comes to charitable organizations? The answer to that question is that
most Code provisions are focused on single transactions that can be looked
at numerically and as simple discrete acts.
For instance, basic income tax principles focus on single transactions at
a time and the question is typically whether a particular expense is deductible
or a particular gain is income. Even in corporate tax, which presents much in
the way of complexity, the fundamental matter at issue is a final taxable
amount. That taxable amount is generated based on thousands of individual
transactions of basic income tax. Each of those transactions is valued and
placed into a minus category, a plus category, or a nothing category. The
charitable organization presents a similar number of economic transactions,
but individual acts that have no value in any economic sense must be
considered as well. And more importantly, although we might envision the
calculus as to each act a question of charitable or not charitable, that calculus
is a more complex social analysis that likely resembles all of the space
between zero and one rather than simply a question of zero and one.
Of course, there are places in the Code where a similar organizational
complexity must be addressed. Partnership taxation comes immediately to
mind. As in the charitable organization area, Congress tends to enact
standards in partnership tax that the IRS must implement by enacting
complex rules. Other matters that call for standards include issues of debt v.
equity, economic substance, and the question of whether a transaction was
arm’s length or not. Those matters are typically dispensed with on a case-bycase basis rather than on the basis of rules established beforehand. This is
likely the place where we end up for a very important reason—predicting all
the possible ways the law might interact with complex reality is impossible
in these realms, and standards simply must govern these worlds.
Finally, the charitable tax-exempt regime applies to an infinite slice of
life. We can find a way to make any sector of our economy charitable. Health
care, insurance, education, grocery stores, the practice of law, the provision
of housing, the provision of credit, the selling of cars, skateboarding, the
operation of a radio, and on and on all can be considered charitable activities
if the organization is established and operates properly. Trying to find simple
rules, or even complex ones, to apply to such complexity is likely an
impossible challenge.
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C. Optimal Kaplow Analysis/Values-Oriented Approach
Using Kaplow’s analysis, we first assess how often the act to be
governed by a rule or a standard is repeated. If an act is repeated often, a rule
is likely preferable. Thus, to do the analysis we need to know what act we
should focus upon.
There is generally no one particular act for charitable organizations. The
most common act, if it can be called that, is for an organization to operate
primarily for a charitable purpose during a taxable year. The most common
place where the IRS considers this question is when the IRS reviews a
charitable organization’s application for recognition as a charitable
organization. It considers this same question when it reviews a charitable
organization on audit. There are some prescriptive rules, such as a complete
ban on inurement or intervention in a political campaign, that often consist
of a simple act. However, even these matters typically assist in the charitable
purpose analysis. For simplicity, the analysis will focus primarily on the
charitable purpose analysis.
As discussed in Part II.C, there are a lot of organizations that must
demonstrate compliance with the charitable tax-exempt regime annually.
According to IRS statistics, here are around 1.2 million charitable
organizations.199 The IRS data, however, is not complete. There are more
charities than represented in data because this number does not include much
of the church community or small organizations.200 Additionally, the IRS
receives around 70,000 applications per year.201 In any case, the number of
charitable organizations is relatively large. This would suggest rules might
be preferable.
The above numbers, however, may misrepresent the total number of
charitable organizations where rules are needed. The charitable standard

199

See McKeever & Pettijohn, supra note 64.

200

Under § 508(c) small organizations and churches need not file an application to be recognized
as a charitable organization.
201
Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations (May 15, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/
uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-501%28c%29-Organizations [hereinafter Questions and
Answers] (noting the number of applications received); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note
81 (noting the number of applications received).
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arguably works like a simple rule for a large percentage of the charitable
sector. A lot of charitable organizations do perfectly charitable things, such
as assisting the needy, educating children, or delivering meals to old
people.202 These likely are some of the most frequent applicants for charitable
status. If we were able to winnow out these organizations from the count of
acts, the total number of organizations is reduced. Yet, we are still probably
left with a significant number of organizations for which more detailed rules
could be useful.
Nevertheless, the question at hand regarding acts is how often the same
act occurs. When we look at it in this way, we find that the act is not repeated
as often as an organization count alone would suggest. As argued above,
almost every charitable organization is charitable in its own way. We have
booster clubs, schools, colleges, technical training, insurance companies,
health care organizations, credit counseling organizations, pet rescue
operations, research institutes, boy scouts, churches, many forms of poverty
relief, housing, old age . . . the list goes on and on. And, within each of those
contexts there is great diversity there too. The means to educate in a
charitable manner are endless, as are the means to supply housing, religion
and every other activity charities engage in. This factor of intense
organizational diversity strongly supports standards. There are few places
where rule development at a legislative level is simple because the “act” is
so complex. Generating information before the “act” is quite difficult. It is
better from an economic sense and an inclusive sense to develop the rule after
the act.
However, there are parts of charitable tax law that do repeat, and there
are instances of discrete acts. For example, inurement and political
intervention typically consist of relatively discrete acts. Where such discrete
acts can be identified, the repeat of the act will be often, the rule to govern
can be of a more simple variety, and unsophisticated parties are more likely
to be able to comply. Professor Aprill is therefore probably right that a simple
rule-based regime would be useful in the political speech context. There are
specific acts that make rules easier to develop. Those rules could lead to a
higher degree of compliance particularly among smaller, less sophisticated

202

But cf. Mayer, supra note 4, at 16 (arguing that it is not clear whether compliance is high or low
because the IRS simply is not looking at enough organizations for us to know).
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charities that would be able to access such simple rules with greater ease.
Troublingly though, it may be impossible to enact rules in the political
activities arena because of the necessarily high political costs to such
rulemaking.203
The analysis however does not stop at the frequency of the act. For
Kaplow, we must take into consideration the sophistication of the parties, the
money involved, and whether rules, even if complex, may generate more
right answers than a standard.
If there are unsophisticated parties, rules might generate a greater degree
of compliance. Unsophisticated parties with little money are unlikely to seek
guidance on the law where it appears that the cost of determining it will
outweigh any gain they might achieve from seeking legal advice. If there are
sophisticated parties and lots of money involved, even if there are only a
small number, it may make sense to invest time in making good rules before
the act.
As developed in Part II.C there are likely many unsophisticated
nonprofit organizations—perhaps 70 to 80% of the field. This factor would
point in the direction of developing rules to obtain greater compliance with
the law. However, those rules likely need to be simple to provide a benefit to
unsophisticated parties because complex rules are likely to dissuade
unsophisticated parties from seeking legal advice. This may be a problem for
rules for charitable organizations. For the reasons discussed above regarding
the diversity of charitable organizations, the rules needed are likely to be
highly complex in this way. Additionally as rule interactions increase, the
complexity of charitable tax law is likely to become truly formidable. Thus,
in the case of charitable purpose, although there may be some desire for rules

203
The IRS arguably tried to do just this in promulgating new rules to apply to the political activities
of social welfare organizations. See I.R.S. News Release, IR-2013-92 (Nov. 26, 2013). The notice was
posted on the Federal Register on November 29, 2013 as a Notice of Public Rulemaking (NPRM).
Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78
Fed. Reg. 71,535 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). In that NPRM the IRS
proposed a rule-based regime. For instance, it explicitly defined voter guides as candidate-related political
activity in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.504-1(a)(2)(iii)(7). Id. Previously, whether a voter guide was not an
exempt activity was determined on a standard that considered all the facts and circumstances. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. Although some provided support for the NPRM, the loudest voices
strongly criticized the new rules. See, e.g., Deirdre Shesgreen, IRS Proposal on Non-profit Political
Activity Criticized, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/02/
26/irs-non-profit-rules/5846445/.
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to increase compliance among unsophisticated parties, we may not be able
accomplish that goal.
There are also sophisticated wealthy organizations such as hospitals,
universities, and foundations. It is possible that spending some significant
up-front time to generate good rules for these organizations could be useful.
These rules would likely need to be complex if we want to avoid significant
under and over inclusion. Thus, developing them is very costly, and may be
impossible because of the change that takes place in these sectors. Also,
highly complex rules in this area might harm the large unsophisticated sector
because these rules are likely to interact with the rules that impact the
unsophisticated parties. That additional complexity again is likely to deter
unsophisticated party compliance.
Finally, in the enforcement context, rules can help enforcers manage
where there are many acts to be reviewed and agency resources are low. IRS
resources are inadequate to oversee the charitable organization sector. This
factor weighs in favor of developing rules to help the IRS manage its
workload. Consistent enforcement of the law with rules may be better than
sporadic inconsistent enforcement of a standard. Of all the factors, this one
weighs the most strongly in favor of rules.
This analysis leaves us with conflicting guidance. Much of the factors
suggest that at the level of charitable purpose we would be best served to
leave the legal command at the level of standards. The complexity and
changing nature of charitable purpose make rules likely to be harmfully
underinclusive and overinclusive. Using rules will fail to incentivize
organizations we want to incentivize. And, using rules will fail to deter an
unacceptable amount of abusive organizations. Nevertheless, lack of
enforcement resources push strongly towards using rules.
What might the values approach recommend? Diver recommends
looking at three factors: transparency, congruency, and accessibility. The
question is which factor is most important to the goals and the environment
in which the law is being applied. Is transparency, congruency, or
accessibility the most important factor in charitable organization oversight?
While external agency rules should likely be more transparent, and
accessible, there is a difference between sanctioning rules and licensing rules.
Diver recognizes that licensing regimes tend to need congruency because of
the wide range of factors and time that are involved. However, he also
recognizes the fact that transparency through rules can help an overwhelmed
agency work through its caseload. In the end, Diver’s analysis sends us to
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probably about the same place. For charitable purpose, standards might be
ideal. However, enforcement ability strongly pushes in favor of some level
of rules—probably simple ones. To the extent charitable tax law is penalizing
discrete acts, such as political campaign intervention, there are stronger
reasons for the use of transparent rules. Additionally, where it veers into
policing fundamental rights, transparent rules may be important and maybe
even necessary.204
What about the Sunstein approach? While Sunstein also considers many
of the same factors as Kaplow and Diver, Sunstein gives some extra thought
to the likelihood of bias, the location and nature of social disagreement, the
stakes, the quality of those who apply the law, and the alignment or
nonalignment of views between lawmakers and others. These factors double
in a sense as questions about whether rules are desired and whether there are
reasons for the legislature or the agency to develop the rules.
If Congress thinks the IRS is likely to enforce charitable tax law with
bias, Congress might want rules over standards. While the recent Tea Party
affair might suggest Congress should be concerned about IRS bias, the run
of the mill charitable purpose issue is probably not that subject to bias. The
IRS itself is fairly insulated from the political process—it only has two
political appointees. Also, the vast majority of charitable determinations
connect little to politics or religion—the two places Congress is likely to be
most concerned about bias. Thus, on the issue of charitable purpose,
Congress should expect a relatively unbiased application by the IRS. This
would tend toward standards for charitable purpose, but maybe rules for
religion and political activities. Of course, again for political reasons, it is
also likely very difficult for Congress itself to agree on rules on these matters.
Other Sunstein factors to consider include: the location and nature of the
social disagreement, the stakes, the quality of those who apply the law, and
the alignment or nonalignment of views between lawmakers and others. The
first issue largely boils down to whether the Congress trusts the IRS or judges
to apply a charitable standard. The stakes involved are often limited because
for many organizations tax exemption does not provide large benefits. An
organization that makes no profit experiences no gain from being relieved of
paying an income tax. However, the stakes can become quite large when the

204
See Hackney, supra note 20, at 454 (arguing that when the Service is investigating a matter
involving fundamental Constitutional rights it should exercise greater care).

Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2015.41 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

Vol. 13 2015 | Charitable Organization |

131

charitable contribution deduction and the other potential benefits that can
flow from charitable status are considered. Thus, the stakes involved may
point towards some consideration of rules.
The quality of the individuals applying the law is an important factor in
charitable organization law. During the Tea Party affair it became evident
that there are not enough workers and that the workforce lacks some
sophistication.205 This factor points towards simple rules in the same way we
determined that an overworked agency may need simple rules to manage its
workload. Of course, Congress has recently enacted a number of laws
constricting the scope of the IRS in applying the laws regarding certain
charitable organizations. This is objective evidence that Congress does not
trust the IRS in applying the standard correctly without the aid of specific
rules.
The Sunstein considerations may tell us something about the desirability
of rules, but they are also quite conclusory. If Congress does not trust the
enforcer, they may choose to impose rules, even if they are not ideal for a
particular situation. Thus, this final set of values to consider seems a little
less useful. Nevertheless, this final assessment does suggest that there is
some need for rules in this environment. It also leads into the next two
questions of who should develop those rules and what form should they take.
D. Who Should Develop Charitable Rules and What Form Should They
Take
The IRS should generally develop the rules regarding charitable
purpose.206 This inclination is driven by the fact that the analysis above only
came to the conclusion that rules are likely useful in this arena because of an
imperfect enforcement environment and lack of sophisticated parties. All
things considered, we might prefer standards for charitable purpose.

205
Nicholas Confessore, David Kocieniewski & Michael Luo, Confusion and Staff Troubles Rife
at IRS Office in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2013 (describing the main IRS office evaluating applications
as an “understaffed Cincinnati outpost that was alienated from the broader I.R.S. culture and given little
direction”).
206

However, this is only the beginning of an analysis because the issue involves the question of
congressional delegation, which is beyond the scope of this article.
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However, since we need rules, how can we best minimize the likely harm
from overinclusion and underinclusion?
Congressionally set charitable purpose rules are likely to be problematic
for the long-term health of charitable organization law for a number of
reasons. Rules set by Congress are highly likely to be reactionary and aimed
at solving some charitable abuse problem.207 Congress is unlikely to be able
to generate the best information in that environment or to enact the type of
rules that will not cause harmful overinclusion and underinclusion. Finally,
and most importantly, the permanence of rules set at that level would increase
the harm of that overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. Congressional
rules are likely aimed at the uncommon situation that Weisbach identified
that occurs in tax law at times. In these instances it is likely that rather than
bringing clarity, Congress creates much more complexity than would have
been needed had it left the imperfect law alone.
The IRS, however, can write rules that provide certainty while
maintaining the flexibility necessary for the changing nature of the concept
of a charitable purpose. The IRS reviews real cases as they arise. This
provides it an informational advantage over Congress that can only access
this information through investigations. The IRS can enact useful guidance
based on that information that responds to real organizational problems.
Additionally, as the facts change over time, the IRS has the flexibility to
change those rules or modify them more significantly than if Congress has
established strict rules.
As to the final question, the IRS should enact these rules in flexible
forms of guidance. Regulations are hard to implement, and are hard to
change. Regulations are likely therefore to suffer from the same problems as
legislation. The IRS and Treasury should, however, consider using
regulations with rules to govern matters of discrete acts such as political
campaign intervention and excess benefit transactions. They should leave
matters of charitable purpose though at the level of standard in the regulation.
Rules regarding charitable purpose can be effectively developed in revenue
rulings and revenue procedures where there is a greater level of flexibility.
These thoughts and conclusions in this section are limited to an ideal
efficiency analysis. An analysis of this matter through the principles of

207
See Troyer, supra note 101 (discussing the tendency of Congress to legislate by anecdote in the
charitable realm, leading to harmful law).
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delegation, rather than through just a rules and standards analysis, could
change these conclusions regarding form. To complete a full analysis of the
legal form we would need to know the level of deference courts should
provide to these products. Courts appear to be quite confused as to what
deference if any that they should give to these forms of guidance.208 If these
forms of guidance are provided limited or no deference, we might think
differently about whether flexible forms of guidance are ideal. Thus, more
work needs be done.
With all of this said, Congress is likely the best rulemaker in a few
instances. First, where there is a need to prescribe certain conduct such as
inurement or engaging in political activities as discussed in Part IV.C, it
makes perfect sense for Congress to set these rules. We have no strong reason
to believe that ideas regarding inurement or political activities are likely to
substantially change or to be highly complex in the way that charitable
purpose is likely to be highly complex. This is also likely to apply in
situations such as UBIT and excess benefit transactions. The activity being
prescribed in both are relatively straightforward taxable transactions.
Congressionally set rules, therefore can provide certainty in these areas
where there is likely little change over time. This can be helpful to the IRS
because of the fact that penalties and high dollar amounts are often owed in
these circumstances.
Second, there may be a place for Congress to enact procedural rules that
make organizations engage in charitable behavior and makes it easy for the
IRS to verify. It is doubtful that the IRS has the authority to impose such
procedures or, even if it does, that it would use that authority, without the
express statutory authority of Congress. These come though with no
insurance that charitable conduct will be better, and they increase the costs
of complying with the charitable regime. Congressional establishment of
these types of rules though does not conflict with the need for flexibility in
defining charitable purpose, because it does not define charitable purpose; it
only sets a procedure for determining whether the organization is operating
for that charitable purpose.
Finally, given the resource challenges faced by the IRS in its exempt
organization division, Congress should consider rules that limit the
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organizations that qualify for charitable status. If Congress finds a category
of organization that is of highly questionable qualification as a charitable
organization, it probably makes good sense to enact a simple rule to remove
the organization from charitable status. Congress did this for insurance
companies by enacting § 501(m). That probably simplified the IRS oversight
role significantly. As discussed below, such a choice might make sense for
hospitals too.
V. ANALYSIS OF RECENT LEGISLATION
In light of the above analysis, what can we say about the effectiveness
of the recent credit counseling, hospital, and supporting organization
legislation? Congress tended towards the rule side of the rule/standard
continuum in these efforts. Obviously, the claim here is that congressional
rules can be expected to be harmful to charitable oversight. Does that analysis
hold up here?
The credit counseling legislation is likely to be harmful to compliance
and oversight, because it largely focused on matters of charitable purpose.
These rules are likely to cause harmful overinclusion and underinclusion.
The supporting organization legislation and hospital legislation will likely
come with problems, but may be saved in part by using procedural rules that
clearly apply to distinct segments of sophisticated charitable organizations.
However, all of these rules added complexity without likely improving
organizational behavior. It is unclear that any benefits outweigh the costs of
the complexity and the underinclusion and overinclusion involved.
A. Credit Counseling Legislation
1. Credit Counseling Legislation
The IRS began to publicly evaluate the credit counseling industry and
its use of charitable tax-exempt status in the early 2000s.209 A credit
counseling organization operates to educate the public on debt management
and also to assist debtors in negotiating with creditors to establish a plan to
get out of debt. At that time, the Federal Trade Commission and state
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regulators were worried that these organizations were taking advantage of
consumers.210 Often, rather than helping individuals get out of debt, some of
these organizations made a debtor’s situation worse. The IRS had recognized
the vast majority of this industry as charitable, and therefore, exempt from
income tax. There were only 200 credit counseling organizations in 1990.
However, by the early 2000s that number had expanded to over 1,000.211 This
increase might have been the result of legislation passed by Congress in 1996
that restricted credit repair organizations from acts perceived as abuses of
debtors, but exempted from the law credit repair organizations that qualified
as charitable organizations under the Code.212
The IRS ruled in 1965 that an organization that assisted individuals with
bad debt could qualify as a tax-exempt social welfare organization under
§ 501(c)(4), but not as a charitable organization.213 While social welfare
organizations are exempt from tax, donors can only deduct their
contributions to a charitable organization.214 In 1969, the IRS ruled that an
organization that educates consumers about credit and helps low-income
individuals manage bad credit could qualify as a charitable organization.215
This rule changed though after the IRS lost a case against an Alabama
organization that helped both low-income and middle-class individuals for a
fee.216 The court held that the organization was educational. It further held
that the specific debt management assistance was an integral part of the
educational activity of the organization. Finally, because the IRS argued that
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the credit counseling organization could not charge a fee for these services,
the court held that a charitable organization is not required to provide services
to low income individuals for free.217
The IRS, the Federal Trade Commission, and state regulators announced
in 2003 that they were all taking a closer look at credit counseling
organizations, and warned consumers about engaging in business with these
organizations.218 The IRS also issued a series of legal opinions219 and
examined a significant segment of the credit counseling industry holding taxexempt status.220 The IRS revoked the tax-exempt statuses of a large segment
of the credit counseling industry because these organizations were not
properly conducting activities for the public benefit.221 The primary attacks
of the IRS in this round were to claim that the organizations did not conduct
education and that they were operated for the private benefit of organization
operators.
In 2006, concerned about the same abuses perceived by the IRS and the
FTC, Congress enacted § 501(q) to apply specific requirements to “credit
counseling organizations” that qualify as charitable or social welfare
organizations under the Code.222 In the new law, described above in Part II.C,
Congress placed far more restrictions on charitable credit counseling
organizations than it had placed on any other charitable industry sector. The
primary goal of the law was to protect consumers who seek help in repairing
credit. Among other matters, it prohibited or limited activities that were
subject to particular abuse such as loans to debtors, fees charged for debt
management plans, and fees for a referral to another organization. Taking
note of the fact that the IRS had been successful in attacking some of these
abuses, the Joint Committee on Taxation Explanation suggests that the new
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legislation is entirely consistent with prior IRS action and guidance, and only
enhanced the IRS efforts.223
Congress defined credit counseling organization functionally. The rules
apply to an organization that provides “substantial” “credit counseling
services” that is trying to qualify and maintain status as a charitable or social
welfare organization.224 Congress defined credit counseling services broadly
to include “the providing of educational information to the general public on
budgeting, personal finance, financial literacy, saving and spending
practices, and the sound use of consumer credit,” or “the assisting of
individuals and families with financial problems by providing them with
counseling.”225
The IRS has issued neither regulations nor revenue rulings on this set of
rules for credit counseling organizations. However, it has engaged in
litigation.226 It also issued a Program Manager Technical Advice
memorandum on whether an organization providing advice to homeowners
on debt needed to abide by the new rules.227 It found that the definition of
credit counseling applied broadly. Instead of the rules applying only to
traditional credit counseling organizations, the rules applied to organizations
assisting homeowners in potential foreclosure situations.
The credit counseling legislation fails on a number of levels. First,
Congress enacted rules regarding charitable purpose, which according to the
above analysis should be problematic. Second, it passed complex rules for a
very small number of organizations. Third, Congress wrote the legislation
broadly such that it likely impacts many groups that Congress did not intend
to impact. Finally, Congress implemented rules that should be applicable to
the industry as a whole, not just those that qualify as tax-exempt. This final
one is admittedly not exactly about rules versus standards.
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Fundamentally, the problem with this legislation is that it imposed rules
on a matter of charitable purpose. Congress tried to define the acts that make
a particular industry organization charitable or not. Given the analysis above,
we should expect this effort to be one of folly, and one that will result in
harmful overinclusion and underinclusion. It should lead to inefficiencies in
the provision of charitable services. The law will discourage efforts that
might have fit the charitable ideal while likely allowing efforts that do not fit
the charitable ideal. A number of other matters compound this problem
though.
At the time of the legislation about 1,000 organizations qualified as
credit counseling organizations. In a relative sense, this is a very small
number of total charitable organizations. Using the Kaplow analysis, this was
likely an inefficient place for Congress to make rules. Because there were a
small number of organizations, it was probably better in a cost sense to rely
more on case-by-case means of analysis. As discussed above, the IRS is
probably the better party to make the rules on charitable purpose for credit
counseling organizations.
But this inefficiency is likely not the only problem with legislating for a
small group. In effect, Congress sought to shut down uncommon situations.
This effort is likely to lead to the problems identified by Weisbach in making
the uncommon common. While Congress might succeed in stopping the
abuses that it was able to anecdotally observe, it likely opened doors for
abuses we are yet to see.
As discussed above, the IRS was already taking on this industry and
having some success. It would have been far better to allow the IRS to reign
in the industry as best as possible. The overall increase of complexity to the
charitable sector with the addition of these complex rules for a small group
of organizations was not worth it.
As identified above, a problem with developing rules for sophisticated
organizations is that those rules, if not cabined properly, might end up
causing harm to the unsophisticated part of the sector. Credit counseling
organizations largely seem to be sophisticated organizations with substantial
amounts of money. Thus, rules might have made sense if Congress could
successfully limit the complexity to that sector alone. The definition of
“credit counseling organization,” however, is so broad that many
organizations outside credit counseling organizations will need to determine
whether the rules apply to them. This is costly and may have the bad effect
that organizations choose not to seek guidance because of the costs involved.
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A further potential problem of the broad definition is that it may result
in the IRS choosing not to apply the law in all applicable circumstances. This
might happen if the law technically applies to an organization that helps
students with student loans, but its application would cause harm to that
organization’s operation. It may not be in the IRS’s political interest to apply
this legislation broadly to activities beyond the traditional credit counseling
organizations. Although these choices are likely to be based in practical
reality of enforcement, this creates real rule of law problems.
Additionally, this legislation is truly focused on consumer protection
rather than charitable purpose. The IRS is probably not the best agency to
handle these matters. Perhaps the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) would
be the better agency. Providing consumer protection jurisdiction to the IRS
could result in the laws being less effective than if placed in a more logical
location such as the FTC. The legislation directs the IRS’s attention away
from charitable tax law. Following the rule of thumb of this article that
Congress should stick to standards in charitable tax law would have stopped
Congress from moving to impose rules in an area where they are not the most
efficient creators of such rules.
Finally, many of the ideas Congress adopted to apply to credit
counseling organizations might be broad principles that could be adopted and
applied to charitable organizations generally. Applying those principles
narrowly leaves a confusing muddle of the law because it calls into question
whether those principles have any application in other areas now. For
example, the requirement of a community board is something that the IRS
often considers as a factor in determining whether an organization is
charitable. Applying it in such a narrow context limits its economy as a rule
and may even lead to conclusions that it is not even a factor in assessing other
charitable organizations. This would be an unfortunate consequence of the
rule.
The point here is not that there should be no credit counseling
organization rules. Instead, Congress probably failed in its drafting of rules
for credit counseling organizations because it is a bad institution to generate
the rules necessary to govern such organizations. There is so much
complexity involved in credit counseling activities that rules generated at the
IRS based on case-by-case knowledge are likely to achieve greater
congruency than those by Congress. What should Congress do instead? Not
pass legislation. For matters of charitable purpose, Congress should stick to
broad standards and allow the IRS to organically develop any needed rules.
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There are ways that Congress can make its interests known to the IRS. It can
hold hearings, conduct research, and communicate concern to the IRS, all
without passing legislation.
B. Hospitals
The IRS has long held that nonprofit hospitals generally qualify as taxexempt charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3).228 Although originally
this status was based upon a hospital providing a substantial amount of
charity care,229 the IRS changed that standard in 1969 to a community benefit
standard.230 In that ruling, the IRS ruled that a hospital that, inter alia: (1) was
open to all in the community who could pay; (2) operated an emergency room
that treated all patients without regard to ability to pay; (3) maintained a
board representative of the community; and (4) generally dealt fairly with its
doctors could qualify for charitable status.231 While there were other ways to
qualify, this came to be known generally as the community benefit standard.
Many criticize the community benefit standard because it allows almost
any hospital to qualify as a charitable organization.232 The primary critique
is that there is no difference between most nonprofit and for-profit hospitals
to justify treating one as exempt from taxation and not the other. Because
nonprofit hospitals provide very similar services and also treat patients in
very similar ways, there is no reason to provide a subsidy to these
organizations goes the argument. Professor Hansmann, for instance, argues
that for profit hospitals would likely be more efficient in an economic sense
than their nonprofit counterparts.233 Some have made the case though that
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nonprofit hospitals do provide some good by providing services that would
otherwise not be provided as sufficiently by for-profit hospitals.234
In the same way that Senator Grassley spurred the IRS into action on
both supporting organizations and credit counseling organizations, Grassley
nudged the IRS to look closer at hospitals, too. In 2009, the IRS released a
report on hospitals.235 The IRS sent out a questionnaire to more than 500
nonprofit hospitals to find out about the sector’s operations. The IRS was
able to draw limited conclusions from the information it generated. It
conducted audits of a number of hospitals that were outliers in executive
compensation.236 This significant review of the hospital sector did not result
in any substantive changes in the IRS position on hospitals. However, the
IRS implemented a new schedule for hospitals on the Form 990 called
Schedule H.237 On that form, the IRS requires hospitals to describe the charity
care they provide, the joint ventures they have entered, and the deals they
have engaged with insiders.
The IRS has spent substantial time implementing regulations regarding
these new rules for hospitals.238 The fact that the IRS has spent time
promulgating regulations suggests that this new law might be a little less on
the rule end of the spectrum than the credit counseling law. A direct
command to establish a written financial assistance policy falls on the rule
side, and while a requirement to conduct a community health needs
assessment is much more rule oriented than operating for a charitable
purpose, it left a lot to be defined.
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Hospitals are the largest sector of charitable organizations by asset
size.239 Thus, good rules, even if complex arguably would be useful to govern
this sector. The analysis above would suggest, though, that it would be better
if the IRS, rather than Congress, drafted these rules. How does the new
hospital legislation fare under the analysis?
The hospital legislation was less complex than the credit counseling
legislation and utilized more procedural-like rules as opposed to behavioral
rules. For instance, the CHNA is a mandated process that the hospital must
perform rather than an activity it must do to be charitable in and of itself.240
The focus on procedure rather than organizational behavior likely allowed
relatively transparent and accessible rules. In considering the need for rules
from an administrative standpoint, process-oriented rules are likely
particularly useful. There is little subjectivity in these rules. Organizations
can follow the rules, and the IRS can relatively easily administer them.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that these new rules will change behavior in
a positive manner. Obviously reviewing charitable needs of the community
and reporting on them does not ensure that the hospital operates more
charitably. Additionally, these rules add extra work and complexity to
charitable law for hospitals. Hospitals already have an obligation imposed by
the IRS to provide fairly significant public disclosure regarding their
activities through the Form 990 and Schedule H. In spite of all of this
disclosure there is still frustration with the hospital sector. It is hard to believe
that the answer really lies in more disclosure.
Thus, Congress increased the costs of both regulating and complying
without clear substantive benefits in return. Rather than encouraging
hospitals to become better actors, these provisions may have the perverse
result of decreasing compliance. Some may choose not to seek counsel
because they are spending time doing busy work complying with Code
provisions. The new rules will also increase rule interactions making
compliance more costly.
These rules will also increase the regulatory costs of the IRS. None of
these new provisions is a substitute for the old law. There is nothing about
the process or the requirements that organizations had to do before these
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provisions, and it is unlikely that they will serve as substitutes for the
community benefit test. Perhaps the CHNA helps provide a tool for the IRS
to ensure that the community benefit standard is being met, but it is still an
extra step. Further compounding the extra costs on the IRS is that Congress
now requires the IRS to audit a hospital once every three years. This is a rule
about agency resources. Diver in particular has suggested that standards are
better in terms of the allocation of scarce agency resources. A regulatory cost
here may be that the IRS may be forced to allocate too many resources to
hospitals, and away from other important sectors.
Congress should consider applying the broad principles it is seeking to
inculcate through this legislation outside of the tax regime or more broadly
within charitable tax law. First, Congress should consider enacting the credit
policies on all hospitals, not just the charitable ones. Realistically, those are
more about consumer protection than about charitable purpose. Using
charitable tax law unnecessarily complicates that law and fails to apply the
principle to all organizations to which the law should apply. Second, there
might be rules that should be applied more broadly to charitable
organizations. This would be a more economical use of rules. If it is the
conclusion that hospitals objectively will behave more charitably if forced to
annually file a community benefit report, perhaps this should be applied to
all charitable organizations.
Finally, Congress could have considered eliminating hospitals
altogether as Congress did with insurance companies.241 This could simplify
the challenge of managing charitable organizations and it may also improve
charitable oversight by eliminating a part of charitable law that leads to
incongruity with ideal charitable law. There are many who have called for
hospitals to lose charitable status for lack of fit with the charitable ideal. A
taxing regime applied to hospitals, although complex, would arguably be a
simpler regime to enforce. Of course, there would be hospitals that would
continue to apply, but they would not need the promotion of health to do so.
Hospitals that are operated to provide substantial care for free to the poor
would continue to qualify, as likely would those that engage in substantial
research or teaching.
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What should Congress do instead? Not act. Hospital behavior is likely
to be about the same as before, but simply subject to greater costs. Thus, it
would be better to have left the state of the law as it is—as a standard.
Alternatively, eliminating hospitals from tax exemption could have enhanced
the oversight of charitable organizations by removing a huge destabilizing
sector from the regime. Hospitals would then be taxable, which comes with
complexity, but a complexity that the IRS is much more prepared to handle.
Finally, consider ways to apply the procedural principles more broadly
whether within charitable tax law or in law more appropriate to the matter at
hand.
C. Supporting Organizations
In 1969, Congress significantly changed charitable organization law.242
Congress passed strict rules to apply to private foundations, which were
defined in a negative manner as any charitable organization that did not
qualify as a public charity.243 Public charities include recognized community
organizations such as hospitals, churches, or schools,244 and also
organizations that receive broad public support.245 All other charitable
organizations are classified as private foundations. A private foundation
tends to receive the vast majority of its support from one family or a small
group of families. Congress imposes highly restrictive rules on private
foundations.246 Additionally, a private foundation is not able to offer as
valuable of a charitable contribution deduction to its donors as it could if it
were a public charity.247
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Congress though provided a means to avoid private foundation status:
form an organization to “support” a public charity.248 Under section
509(a)(3), the family foundation seeking supporting organization status must
meet several tests. The key test is the relationship test. Under that test the
organization must be operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection
with one or more public charities.249
The IRS enacted some of its most complex regulations250 to stem abuses
of the supporting organization structure. A supporting organization looks
much like a private foundation. Like private foundations, the biggest concern
is that a wealthy individual might put significant funds into the supporting
organization, take a large deduction, and yet pay little in actual money to
charity. In other words, the structure potentially allows a charitable deduction
without a real charitable contribution.
In the late 1990s, the media placed a spotlight on the abuse of supporting
organizations. One national article pointed to cases such as that of Gerry
Spence, who contributed a ranch to a supported organization and continued
to use the place for his own purposes.251
Type I supporting organizations must establish a legal relationship with
a supported organization similar to a parent-subsidiary relationship.252 In
other words, in the Type I structure, a public charity appoints the board of
the supporting organization. In that way, a public charity controls the actions
of the supporting organization, and Congress can generally expect the
organization to behave in the interest of the public charity rather than the
wealthy donor. A Type II supporting organization is said to establish a
brother-sister-like
corporate
relationship
with
its
supported
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organization(s).253 This means the same people that control the supported
organization control the supporting organization. That leaves Type III
supporting organizations. In a Type III structure, there is no direct control by
a supported organization or supported organizations.254 The supported
organization instead typically has what is referred to as a significant voice in
the decisions of the supporting organization.255
In its report, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector singled out the Type III
structure as particularly subject to abuse. The Panel recommended imposing
a payout requirement on Type III supporting organizations to ensure the
supporting organization distributed a significant amount of money to its
supported organization.256 The report stated: “a donor may inappropriately
maintain de facto control over a Type III supporting organization and then
cause it improperly to provide private benefits.”257
The new rules described above in Part II.C show that Congress tried to
stop the abuse of the Type III structure in particular. The IRS has spent
significant time providing guidance regarding these new supporting
organization rules. It issued a notice about the new requirements, an
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, a notice of proposed rulemaking,
and a final regulation along with another notice of proposed rulemaking.258
The supporting organization legislation is not about charitable purpose.
It instead focuses on organizational structure and behavior. Thus, Congress
here avoided the trap of legislating on charitable purpose. Also, there are a
large number of supporting organizations and they hold a lot of assets.259
These rules are additionally fairly well confined to a narrow circumstance
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that mostly sophisticated taxpayers will encounter. Thus, legislating here, if
sufficiently focused could be a real help.
It is difficult to assess whether these rules will help in terms of
compliance and regulation. The overall mix seems to significantly
complicate both compliance and regulation. This may be a good thing. Rules
prohibiting loans to substantial contributors are bright line rules that are easy
to comply with and easy to apply. Rules that require a supporting
organization to provide notice to its supporting organizations are also
common sense easy to apply rules. These are transparent and likely work
toward the intended goal of the law. It is also possible that imposing a payout
requirement on certain Type III supporting organizations reduced complexity
because it eliminates uncertainty for grantmaking organizations. However,
the payout regulations themselves are highly complex too. The other
additional rules tended to add total requirements to the already complex
system.
The most likely problem with these rules is that they might have been
designed to stop the charitable abuse of yesterday rather than today. They
were built to stop abuses Congress observed anecdotally. If that is the case,
then these rules unnecessarily complicated the law without pushing more
money to charitable purposes.
These rules are also an example of the politics of rulemaking. Because
Congress did not have the political capital to pass a statute imposing a
significant payout requirement on Type III supporting organizations, it
instead asked the IRS to determine that amount. Ultimately that became a
political problem for the President’s administration, and again, politically,
the payout was set at a very low level.
Given the complexity involved in regulating these organizations, it is
likely that instead of maintaining the structure in full, the best solution here
was to eliminate Type III supporting organizations, and significantly reduce
complexity.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a strong political desire to stop abuses of charitable
organizations through the IRS. Congress is inclined to pass legislation that
appears tough on those who abuse charities. But, Congress can cause harm
to the regulation of the charitable sector when it enacts detailed rules
regarding charitable purpose. Although a congressman may find problems in
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the sector, the congressman should be reticent to enact rules. He should allow
the system to develop organically instead. He should stick to standards and
generally stay away from rules at the statutory level. However, if the
congressman wants to enact rules, he should look for discrete acts and broad
application.
The complexity, diversity, and the changing nature of the charitable
ideal suggest that standards should rule charitable tax law. Additionally, that
the charitable ideal is based in part on supporting diverse and new ideas
commends the use of standards. Rules defining charitable purpose are likely
to cut off this diversity-enhancing goal of the charitable ideal. However, a
number of factors point toward rules. There are a large number of charitable
organizations and many are unsophisticated. Providing rules in this context
could ensure greater compliance. The sophisticated charities have significant
amounts of money. Again, it might be worth the upfront costs to generate
rules for these organizations given the dollars involved. Finally, and maybe
most importantly enforcement resources are not adequate for oversight.
Rules may be the only way to make the lack of enforcement resources
functional. Thus, despite the initial sense that rules are not ideal to govern
the charitable ideal, they are needed to make oversight possible.
While these factors point in different directions, in order to best maintain
the charitable ideal, Congress should generally stick to standards for legal
commands regarding charitable purpose. It should allow the IRS to enact
flexible rules that are informed by its daily case-by-case analysis. To
maintain that flexibility, the IRS should stick to more flexible forms of
guidance such as revenue rulings and procedures rather than regulations.
These conclusions regarding who should enact rules and what form those
rules should take are based on a rules versus standards analysis alone. To
make a more informed conclusion we need a thorough analysis of the issue
of delegation by Congress in the charitable tax law arena and the degree of
deference courts should extend to different forms of charitable tax law
guidance. These issues are beyond the scope of this article though.
This analysis, however, does suggest that Congress can usefully enact
rules on discrete acts of charitable organization personnel. Thus, Congress
would be well advised to enact rules for political campaign intervention and
matters related to inurement. Additionally, Congress should consider
enacting some rules that it applied only to credit counseling organizations
more broadly. For instance, the requirement of a community board could be
usefully extended to all charitable organizations. Only applying it to one
narrow sector likely causes harm to charitable law generally. Additionally,
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Congress should consider whether relatively easily administered procedural
rules, such as the CHNA requirement imposed on hospitals, would be a
positive move for oversight and compliance. Given that there is already
substantial reporting on Form 990, it is hard to imagine additional reporting
could have this effect, but it is worth consideration because of its easy use.
These recommendations are no panacea for charitable organization
oversight. The only claim here is that this best balances the current oversight
and compliance environment challenges. It also makes the claim that efforts
to improve oversight by enacting new restrictive rules on charitable purpose
can be expected to backfire.
Finally, to make this recommendation work, the IRS needs to allocate
more resources towards enacting useful publicly available rules on matters
of charitable purpose. The IRS tends to move slowly. It will have to do better
in this regard. But, a message of this article is that spending its resources in
this way is likely to pay dividends to the IRS on the enforcement end.
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